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The IMF and Regulation of Cross-Border Capital Flows
Adam Feibelman*

Abstract
This Article examines the InternationalMonetay Fund's recent efforts to play an
assertive regulatoy role with regardto global capitalflows. There is a growing consensus among
scholars andpoligmakers that states must carefully manage capitalflows and coordinate their
poliiesfor doing so, and that direct capitalcontrols are a usefulpart of theirpolig toolkit in
extreme circumstances.After manj years of evolution in this direction, the Fund has become a
leading proponent of this consensus, and it now views helping its members manage capital
movements to be a prominentpart of its post-crisismandate. This effort has become one of the
centerpieces of the Fund's bilateral and multilateral surveillance and its particpation in
internationalfinancial regulation. The Fund has embraced this role against a backdrop of a
web of uncoordinated international trade and investment agreements that commit states to
liberaliZe their capital account poliies. There is currently no other multilateralframework
designed to sstematicaly manageglobalcapitalfilows. Forthe foreseeablefuture, the Fundis in
a unique position to play a productive role in helping states craft consistent approaches to
capitalflows and in promoting internationalcoordination of these poliies. It faces significant
challenges in the effort, however, including its members'potentialy conflicting oblgations under
trade and investment treaties, uncertainty about itsjurisdictionover capitalfilows, andpervasive
limitations of the consultative mode of its surveillance. Thus, the Fund's ambition to help its
members manage capitalflows will be an important test of its post-crisis mandate to promote
globalstabilit.

Sumter Davis Marks Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. Thanks to Saru Matambanadzo, ShuYi Oei, Martin Weiss, participants in and organizers of the Duke Journal of Comparative and
International Law symposium, Investment in Emerging Markets: The Challenges of Infrastructure
Development, the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law symposium, International
Regulation ofInvestment in the Rising Powers, and the Tulane Law School faculty workshop series.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, and especially since the recent global economic
and financial crisis, the International Monetary Fund has increasingly asserted its
role in the emerging framework for international financial regulation. This role is
generally underestimated and mischaracterized in the legal literature.' The Fund
is charged with ensuring the stability of the international monetary system and
with enforcing its members' obligations under international monetary law.2
Initially, the Fund did not construe this mandate as requiring extensive
engagement with its members' financial sectors. As financial crises since the
1990s have made clear, however, stability of domestic and international financial
systems is integral to monetary and economic stability. As a result, promoting
financial stability has become a central focus of the Fund's regulatory activity.'
This increased focus on financial stability has in turn led to a significant
evolution in the Fund's efforts to influence its members' policies regarding
cross-border capital flows. Thus, the Fund's efforts to help manage global
capital flows provide an important illustration of the institution's post-crisis
mission and its potential role in international financial regulation.
Cross-border capital flows are the connective tissue of the international
financial system and, in recent decades, they have become an enormous part of
the global economy.' The expansion of cross-border capital flows has coincided
with the liberalization of domestic rules in advanced economies and many
emerging economies, often pursuant to international agreements regarding
foreign investment.' The recent global financial crisis dramatically illustrated,
however, that there are costs and potential pitfalls associated with the increasing
volume of capital flows. Heavy capital inflows can fuel asset value bubbles and

I

2

This misapprenhension of the Fund's role in international financial regulation is examined in
Adam Feibelman, Remiapping International Financial Regulation (work in progress, available from
author).
See discussion infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.

3

See discussion infra notes 99, 108-109 and accompanying text.

4

See,

for example, ANNAMARIA VITERBO, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND MONETARY
MEASURES: LiMITATIONS To STATES' SOVEREIGNTY AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 39 (2012) (noting
that the current volume of capital flows "greatly exceeds the volume of international payments");
HAL S. Scorr & ANNA GEL PERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, PoLICY, AND
REGULATION 19 (18th ed. 2011) (noting the dramatic increase in foreign investment in U.S. stocks
between 1977 and 2003); Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-BorderCapital
Flows, at 3 (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/
111510.pdf ("[1]nternational asset positions now dwarf[] output."); see also IMF, The Fund's Role
Regarding Cross-BorderCapitalFlows, at 3 ("Global capital flows have multiplied many times over in
recent years, mainly between advanced economies but increasingly also to emerging markets.").

5

See infra Section V.A.
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exchange rate appreciation, overwhelm regulatory and supervisory capacity, and
make an economy vulnerable to capital flow reversals. Capital outflows can
create downward pressure on asset values and the exchange rate and can deplete
foreign reserves. Most troubling, inability to control rapid outflows can imperil
domestic financial systems and exacerbate or spur an acute financial crisis with
likely spillover effects. Thus, there is a growing consensus that cross-border
capital flows need to be more carefully managed at both the domestic and
international levels. As Annamaria Viterbo notes, the "dynamics" of capital
movements "are central both to international monetary stability and global
financial stability."'
Yet managing capital flows and global liquidity is a profoundly difficult
endeavor. Historically, states have utilized a wide variety of policies to affect the
ability or inclination of both foreign investors and domestic residents to make
cross-border investments.' These include direct limitations on transfers of
financial assets, taxes on cross-border financial transactions, capital exit levies,
limits on the domestic use of foreign currency or on nonresidents' access to
local currency, domestic bank deposit requirements, restrictions on deposit
withdrawals, and differential exchange rate regimes for cross-border
transactions.' Some countries have maintained controls throughout the modern
era and have effectively avoided fully integrating with the international financial
system.' Others have liberalized and then imposed controls in response to
particular circumstances. Prominent examples of the latter include Chile's

6

VITERBO, supra note 4, at 196.

7

See IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-BorderCapital Flows, supra note 4, at 25 ("The term 'capital
controls' is used broadly and sometimes loosely to cover a very broad range of official measures
affecting international capital movements. While typically applied to limits on the rights of
residents or nonresidents to enter into underlying capital transactions (for example, limits on the
external debt of residents), they can also apply to the payments and transfers associated with these
transactions.").
See Scorr & Git.PERN, supra note 4, at 575; Kevin P. Gallagher & Yuan Tian, Regulating Capital
Flows in Emerging Markets: The IMF and the Global FinancialCrisis, at 7 (Global Econ. Governance
Initiative, Working Paper No. 5, May 2014); see also OLIVIER JEANNE ET AL., WHO NIEDS TO
OPEN THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT? 4-5 (PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON. 2012) (discussing the

variety of "species of capital controls"); M. Ayhan Kose et al., FinancialGlobali.ation:A Reappraisal,
at 70-73 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 06/189, Aug. 2006) (setting forth a taxonomy
of capital flow management measures); Eswar S. Prasad & Raghuram G. Rajan, A Pragmatic
Approach to CapitalAccount Iiberali.ation,22 J. ECON. PERSP. 149, 163 (2008) ("The measures that
countries have put in place to control capital flows come in various flavors. For example, controls
can be imposed on inflows or outflows; on different types of flows (like foreign direct investment,
portfolio equity, or portfolio debt); flows of different maturities; and flows into specific sectors.").
9

China and India are prominent examples. See Scorr & GELPERN [19th ed.], supra note 4, at 657;
IMF, Iberaliging Capital Flows and Managing Outflows, at 26-33 (Mar. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/031312.pdf.
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controls on inflows in the early 1990s,'o Malaysia's controls on outflows in the
late 1990s," and Iceland's dramatic controls on outflows during the most recent
crisis.12 More recently, numerous countries have adopted policies to limit capital
inflows in response to expansionary post-crisis policies in large economies."
Scholars and policymakers continue to debate the efficacy and effects of these
policies.14 Furthermore, there is growing concern that some countries may be
employing controls to limit appreciation of their currencies and thereby gain a
competitive advantage for domestic exporters."
Adding complexity to the task of managing capital flows, the relevant
policies that affect capital movements are not limited to those that directly
regulate cross-border financial transactions. They include a wider range of
policies that impact global investment patterns and allocation of global liquidity,
especially domestic monetary and exchange rate policies." The external effects
of domestic policies designed to manage capital flows in or out of an economy
are often unanticipated or broader than intended. Policies that cause outward
capital flows generally create inflows elsewhere and vice versa. They can also
indirectly impact similarly situated countries by raising concerns among market
participants that those other countries will adopt similar policies. Thus,
managing cross-border capital flows requires international, multilateral
coordination across a broad range of policies, some of which impact capital
flows only indirectly.
The existing legal framework affecting capital flows is not designed for the
purpose of managing flows, and it is ill-suited to the task. Most of that
framework is a decentralized and overlapping patchwork of bilateral, regional,
and multilateral agreements. These agreements are primarily designed to
promote international trade and investment, and they generally commit states to
10 At that time, Chile imposed significant reserve deposit requirements for portfolio investments to
stem surging capital inflows. See Scorr & GELPERN [19th ed.], supra note 4, at 1275.
11

12

In 1998, to stem speculation against its ringgit, Malaysia required the repatriation of all ringgit
assets held abroad, required that subsequent sales of ringgit assets be conducted through
Malaysian intermediaries, and temporarily banned the repatriation of foreign portfolio
investments. See IMF, JiberaliingCapital Flows and Managing Ouflows, supra note 9, at 37; Ethan
Kaplan & Dani Rodrik, Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?, at 9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8142, Feb. 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w8142.pdf.
During the recent crisis, Iceland broadly prohibited conversion of krona assets to foreign
currency. See IMF, Liberalizing Capita/Flowsand ManagingOufflows, supra note 9, at 33, 36.

13

See, for example, Gallagher & Tian, supra note 8, at 3-4 & fig.1 (noting the large capital inflows to
emerging markets since the global crisis).

14

See, for example, discussion infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.

iS

See discussion infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.

16

See discussion infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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remove obstacles to cross-border capital movements." They allow for widely
varying degrees of flexibility for managing capital inflows and outflows to
preserve or restore financial stability. Perhaps most concerning, the variety of
obligations regarding capital movements pursuant to these international
agreements may impede broader international coordination of national policies
affecting global capital flows.
Against this background, the International Monetary Fund has expanded
its efforts to influence its members' policymaking affecting capital flows and to
facilitate international coordination in this context. Although the scope of the
Fund's jurisdiction over its members' policies regarding capital movements is
unclear,' 8 those policies have become an increasingly important focus of the
Fund's regulatory mandate as global capital flows began to play a more dynamic
role in the burgeoning international financial system in recent decades. In the
wake of the global financial crisis, the Fund began to take a more assertive
posture in consulting with its members about their capital flow management
policies and in conducting broader surveillance of their policies affecting global
capital flows.
In 2012, Fund staff proposed an "institutional view" of its members'
"liberalization and management of capital flows."" Building on previous staff
positions and advice to members over the years, this view generally embraces
liberalization of capital flows when carefully sequenced with development of the
financial sector and other institutions. Perhaps more significantly, it emphasizes
the need for its members to manage cross-border capital flows through macroprudential policies and, in some circumstances, more targeted controls.20 The
Fund has also undertaken the task of facilitating multilateral coordination of its
members' domestic policies that affect global capital flows. It has recently
reconceptualized its surveillance mandate to encompass more comprehensive
multilateral surveillance of the international monetary system, focusing in
particular on the spillover effects of its members' domestic policies. The
potential role of cross-border capital flows in causing or transmitting financial
instability is a primary focus of this newly redesigned multilateral surveillance.
Currently, the Fund's engagement in this area represents the only
multilateral effort or framework designed to systematically manage global capital
flows. The Fund's effort to help its members manage global capital flows is
17
18

19

20

See discussion infra notes 189-221 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra notes 110-125 and accompanying text.
See generaly IMF, The Lberalization and Management of Capital Flows: An Institutional View
(Nov. 14, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/111412.pdf
[hereinafter An Institutional View].
See discussion infra notes 167-174 and accompanying text.
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therefore a notable example of the potential impact of its regulatory role in the
international financial system. As with other aspects of the Fund's surveillance,
especially its expanding financial surveillance, however, it remains to be seen
whether the Fund's newly articulated approach to capital movements will in fact
enable it to have a more meaningful impact on its members' policies. As other
commentators have observed, the Fund's newly articulated institutional view is
cast in general terms and leaves domestic policymakers to grapple with
significant uncertainty and ambiguity."1 Those policymakers must navigate
potentially conflicting obligations under other trade and investment agreements,
and the scope of the Fund's legal mandate over members' policies regarding
capital flows is uncertain. Thus, the Fund's project to improve international
coordination of the management of global capital flows will inevitably prove to
be an important test of its post-crisis surveillance function, especially its newly
articulated mandate to conduct multilateral surveillance.
To be clear, this Article does not aim to assess the substantive merits of the
Fund's efforts or its actual impact on members' regulation of capital flows or on
their financial policies more generally. Instead, it describes how the Fund's newly
defined approach to its members' policies regarding capital flows represents the
only systematic attempt to regulate and coordinate global capital flows at the
international level. In so doing, it aims to illustrate how the Fund's engagement
with capital flows reflects the institution's ambition to play a meaningful role in
international financial regulation. Section II describes the emerging consensus
concerning the need for cross-border capital flow management. Section III
addresses the Fund's jurisdiction over capital movements, its evolving view of
the policies its members should adopt to effectively manage capital flows, and its
efforts to influence and help coordinate those policies. Section IV describes a
number of practical challenges to these efforts, including potential tensions with
the large web of international trade and investment agreements that touch upon
capital flows, analytical complexity, and general limitations of the Fund's modes
of bilateral and multilateral surveillance.

II. REASSESSING CROSS-BORDER CAPITAL FLOWS
The recent global financial crisis accelerated a shift in the prevailing views
among domestic and international policymakers regarding cross-border capital
flows. This Section describes an emerging consensus regarding capital flows,
which favors a cautious approach to liberalizing the regulatory treatment of such
flows and reflects a growing receptiveness to managing them. This emerging
consensus acknowledges that managing capital flows involves a broad range of

21

See discussion infra notes 236-240 and accompanying text.

Winter 2015

415

Chicago Journalof InternationalLaw

domestic policies, including some not traditionally understood as capital
controls, and that it often requires multilateral coordination of these policies.
A. New Caution
In the decades leading up to the recent crisis, domestic and international
policymakers had generally converged on a commitment to the goal of
liberalizing the regulatory treatment of cross-border capital flows22 by limiting or
removing restrictions on capital movements.23 Until the modern era, limits on
cross-border capital movements were pervasive;24 they had been "enshrined in
the international financial architecture" after World War 11.25 The trend toward
liberalization began in the 1960s, 2 6 reflecting optimism about the potential
benefits and effects of mobile capital. Removing obstacles to cross-border
movement of capital can, in theory, promote efficient allocation of financial
resources 2 and international pooling of financial risk.28 Foreign investment is
22

23

See, for example, JEANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 1-2 (describing a consensus in the decade
preceding the recent crisis that free capital mobility was required for "full membership in the
'advanced country club"'); Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista & Changyong Rhee, Capital Controls:
A Pragmatic Proposal, at 1 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 337, Feb. 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2236562 ("[P]rior to the global financial
crisis of 2008-2009, it is fair to say that capital controls were not generally viewed favorably.");
Manuela Moschella, The InstitutionalRoots of IncrementalChange: The IMF and CapitalControls after the
GlobalFinanialCrisis, BRITIsHJ POL. & INT'L REI. 1, 1 (2014) ("[Clapital account liberalisation had
been a hallmark of global economic governance over the past two decades.").
See IMF, IiberaliingCapital Flows and Managing Ounflows, supra note 9, at 6 ("In its broadest sense,
[liberalization of capital flows] means the elimination of measures that could hamper international
capital flows."); Prasad & Rajan, supra note 8, at 165 (describing various approaches to liberalizing
treatment of capital flows); see also Michael Waibel, BIT by BIT: The Silent liberalisationof the Capital
Account, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF

CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 1, 2-3 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) (describing capital account
convertibility).
24
25

For a discussion of policies that states have used to control capital flows, see infra notes 50-58
and accompanying text.
Moschella, supra note 22, at 1. See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 39 (explaining why liberalization of
capital flows was not addressed in the Bretton Woods framework).

26

See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 182.

27

See Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 1 ("Standard theory regards capital controls as
barriers to free capital mobility which prevent capital-scarce countries from borrowing at lower
rates to finance investment and current consumption. This inter-temporal consumption
smoothing is welfare-enhancing and efficient, since it allows countries with insufficient capital to
use the excess capital of other countries."); Charles Engel, CapitalControls: What Have We Learned?,
Bank
of
Int'l
Settlements
Papers
No.
68,
at
24
(2012),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2206275 ("International flows will, in an
ideal world, move capital to its most productive use."); Jonathan D. Ostry et al., CapitalInflows: The
Role of Controls, at 4, IMF Staff Note no. 10/04 (Feb. 19, 2010) (noting that capital mobility can
"allow countries with limited savings to attract financing for productive investment projects"); see
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widely believed to fuel economic growth in recipient countries. 29 Participation by
international investors may promote the development of domestic financial
sectors and related regulations in recipient markets." It may also reduce
opportunities for corruption and cronyism.3 1 This optimism aside, empirical
research to date on the benefits of liberalizing the regulatory treatment of capital
movements has proved inconclusive.3 2 For example, it remains unclear how
much increasing capital inflows actually help fuel economic growth in lowincome countries.33
Although the benefits of capital flows are difficult to measure, their
potential costs and hazards are increasingly discernible. The recent crisis saw
"significant surges and sudden stops in cross-border capital flows" 3 and,
subsequently, renewed flows as advanced economies pursued expansive
monetary policies. 35 This experience has underscored aspects of cross-border

28

also Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Forty Years' EAperience with the OECD Code of
Liberalisation of Capital Movements, at 3 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
investment-policy/44784048.pdf (proposing that the benefits of liberalization "include[] increased
integration of enterprises into the world economy; wider investment choice and risk
diversification for domestic savers; salutary market signals for economic policy discipline; and
enhanced public sector transparency and better governance overall").
See Bianca De Paoli & Anna Lipinska, Capital Controls: A Normative Analysis, at 2 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 600, Feb. 2013), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/staff reports/ sr600.pdf ("[R]estricting international capital movements ... critically
limits cross-border pooling of risk."); Ostry et al., supra note 27, at 4 (noting that capital mobility
can "foster the diversification of investment risk").

29
3o

31

32

See, for example, IMF, Liberaligng CapitalFlows and Managing Oufflows, supra note 9, at 15 ("In many
countries, FDI has helped to boost investment, employment, and growth.").
See, for example, Engel, supra note 27, at 24 ("International investors might impose more market
discipline on local economies, driving out inefficient firms in favor of better organized and
managed companies. International inflows might [also] spur development of local capital
markets."); Prasad & Rajan, supra note 8, at 150 ("The debate is refocusing on a different set of
benefits, primarily the indirect or 'collateral' benefits that accrue to a country's governance and
institutions when it opens up to cross-border capital flows."); Ostry et al., supra note 27, at 4
(noting that capital mobility can "contribute to the development of financial markets").
See Engel, supra note 27, at 24 ("Lurking behind all of these reservations is the concern that capital
controls might be implemented to serve some political purpose, or for the gain of the
policymakers' friends, family and political supporters. A hands-off policy is obviously much more
transparent.").
See, for example, IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-Border Capital Flows, supra note 4, at 21
("[N]either the benefits of liberalization nor the costs and effectiveness of capital controls are
well-established in the empirical research.").

33

See, for example, Prasad & Rajan, supra note 8, at 149 ("[C]ross-country regressions suggest little
connection from foreign capital inflows to more rapid economic growth for such countries.").

34

Gallagher & Tian, supranote 8, at 3-4 fig.1.

3s

See Gallagher & Tian, supra note 8, at 4.
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capital flows that were underappreciated in the years leading to the crisis,"6
especially their potentially destabilizing effects.
Capital inflows, for example, can fuel credit booms and asset bubbles by
increasing the availability of credit and can contribute to exchange rate
appreciation.37 A rising exchange rate can "undermine the competitiveness of the
tradable sector, thereby jeopardizing exports and growth."38 More dramatically,
booms and bubbles can overwhelm a jurisdiction's capacity for supervision of its
financial sector." In many of the countries that experienced acute financial crises
in recent years, "prudential regulation and supervision in these recipient
countries had not kept up with the challenges posed by growing inflows."40
Inflows, especially those with short-term maturities, can thereby increase
vulnerability to instability in the financial sector. Most of the financial, banking,
and debt crises in recent decades have followed periods of credit booms fueled
by external investment and capital. The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s
dramatically followed this pattern,4 1 proving to be a turning point in scholars'
and policymakers' views on capital movements.42 During the recent global
financial crisis, emerging economies with "pre-crisis inflow surges suffered larger
output losses ... [Those] with greater restrictions on capital inflows (especially
on debt liabilities) fared better."43 As a result, there is a newly heightened
appreciation among scholars and policymakers that there are "market
development and institutional" preconditions for effective liberalization of

36

See Ostry et al., supra note 27, at 9 (describing various types of inflows and their relative
"riskiness"); Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 1 ("[New perspectives on the role of
capital controls are now emerging in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.").

37

See Ostry et al., supra note 27, at 4; Kristin J. Forbes & Francis E. Warnock, Capital Flow Waves:
Surges, Stops, Flight, and Retrenchment, at 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
17351, Aug. 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl7351; Prasad & Rajan, supra note
8, at 150; Moschella, supra note 22, at 8 ("ICIapital inflows constitute a serious challenge to
domestic economic management.").

38

Moschella, supra note 22, at 7-8.

39

See infra notes 44-45, 161-166 and accompanying text (discussing the need for institutional
capacity before financial liberalization).

40

41

IMF, Liberaliging CapitalFlowsand Managing Ouflows, supra note 9, at 14 ("The growth experience
of 48 [emerging market economies] since the onset of the crisis suggests that de facto measures of
openness (primarily bank-intermediated flows) were significant predictors of growth declines, as
were banks' pre-crisis leverage and credit growth.'.
See IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-Border CapitalFlows,supra note 4, at 19 ("jTihe belief held

42

by many that the Asian crisis ... had its roots in premature capital account liberalization.").
See infra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.

43

IMF, IiberaliingCapitalFlowsand Managing Oufilows, supra note 9, at 14-15.
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capital movements," as well as a growing skepticism that full liberalization is a
universally appropriate goal.45
The crisis has also underscored concerns about the destabilizing effects of
capital outflows." Rapid capital outflows can significantly exacerbate
deteriorating financial and economic conditions and impede crisis resolution.
They can cause or exacerbate collapsing currency values, deplete reserves, and
precipitate credit freezes, which can quickly bleed into the real economy.4 7 The
recent crisis also illustrated how cross-border capital movements can amplify the
external effects of domestic financial crises, threaten global stability,4 8 and serve
as "the principal conduit for the transmission of global shocks." 4 9
Domestic policymakers around the globe have employed various policies
designed to stem capital outflows throughout the modern era, especially in
periods of financial crisis.o Such policies have included direct prohibition of
repatriation of capital, waiting periods for repatriation, and exit levies." Given
the disruptions in capital flows during the crisis and concerns about surging
inflows in emerging economies thereafter,52 scholars and policymakers are now
44

See Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 6 ("There is some agreement in the literature that
a certain minimum threshold level of financial market development and institutional
infrastructure have to be met before the gains from financial liberalization can be realized."). See
Prasad & Rajan, supra note 8, at 166 ("[N]ot all countries are ready for capital account
liberalization-typically the more developed the country, the readier it is.").

45

See, for example, JEANNE FT AL., supra note 8, at 112-14 (" [Ihe free international mobility of capital
should not be considered the ideal toward which all countries [in the] world should aspire.");
IMF, Laiberaliing Capital Flows and Managing Oulows, supra note 9, at 17 ("[R]ecent research
suggests that there is no certainty that full liberalization is an appropriate objective for all
countries at all times, and that a more cautious approach to liberalization is warranted.");
VITERBO, supra note 4, at 191 (discussing the potential costs of liberalizing capital flows).
See Moschella, supra note 22, at 8 (noting that during the initial phase of the recent crisis, emerging
markets had to deal with surging capital outflows).

46

47

48

Engel, supra note 27, at 23 (noting "exchange rate externalities" imposed by individual borrowers
and lenders when they retrench); Forbes & Warnock, supra note 37, at 4 (noting that "sudden
stops [in capital flows] are correlated with currency depreciations, slower growth, and higher
interest rates").
See IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-BorderCapital Flows, supra note 4, at 3 ("lW]ith international
asset positions now dwarfing output, global portfolio allocations and reallocations have profound
effects on the world economy.").

49

Id. at 3.

so

See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 157 (noting pervasive outflow controls during the 1930s, in Latin
America during 1980s, in Malaysia, Thailand, and Russia during 1990s, and in Iceland in 2008).

5

See id.

52

See JEANNE FT AL., supra note 8, at 13 (noting a "new tide of capital flows from advanced to
developing and emerging-market economies" since the crisis); Moschella, supra note 22, at 8
(observing that, after 2009, "the easing of monetary conditions in the advanced economies
pushed capital flows" toward emerging markets).
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increasingly receptive to policies designed to control or manage both capital
outflows and inflows." Policies to control inflows are increasingly understood as
tools for preventing54 as well as resolving crises." Historically, such policies have
included taxation of inflows, limitations on non-residents' access to domestic
bank accounts, residence requirements for domestic investment, and restrictions
on residents' foreign borrowing." They generally aim to "[r]educe the volume of
capital flows . .. [and] [a]lter the composition of capital flows (towards longer
maturity flows),"" which may reduce pressure on the exchange rate and give

s3

Seefor example, ScoTr & GELPERN, supra note 4, at 577 ("The policy consensus on capital controls
has shifted palpably in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The IMF, its major
shareholders, and prominent policy officials previously on record as opposing capital controls,
have expressed cautious support for controls as a temporary measure to counter global liquidity
pressures, disorderly exchange rate movements and financial instability."); seealso Kristin Forbes
et al., Bubble Thy Neghbor: Porfolio Effects and Externalitiesfrom CapitalControls, at 1 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18052, May 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
wl 8052 ("Some economists and policymakers have recently become more supportive of controls
on capital inflows, particularly if they are aimed at limiting the appreciation of overvalued
currencies and reducing financial fragilities resulting from large and volatile capital flows.");
Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 1 ("Indeed, past aversion to capital controls has
seemingly been replaced with a new appreciation of its contribution to economic policy as a tool
for financial stability."); Moschella, supra note 22, at 2 ("While in the 1990s the predominant view
was that capital controls should not belong to the policy toolkit that countries can use to manage
capital inflows, [they] are now regarded as useful instruments."); VITERBO, supra note 4, at 191-92
(discussing the trend toward a more favorable view of capital controls).

54

See De Paoli & Lipinska, supra note 28, at 1 ("[C]apital controls can be-and often are-used as a
tool to manage exchange rate fluctuations."); Scorr & GEi.PERN, supra note 4, at 575 (noting the
use of capital controls "to counter the financial and economic impact of foreign exchange
markets"); PAIAis-ROYAL INITIATIvE, REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: A
COOPERATIvE APPROACH FOR THE TvENTY FIRST CENTURY 11 (2011), available at http://global-

currencies.org/smi/gb/telechar/news/RapportCamdessus-integral.pdf ("[Flurther consideration
should be given to measures, such as capital controls and broader macro-prudential measures that
might effectively allow countries to protect their economies from the negative effects of large
and volatile capital] flows."). But cf Engel, supra note 27, at 24 (noting that "controlled exchange
rates might be more misaligned than uncontrolled exchange rates"); VITERBO, supra note 4, at 156.
ss

See, for example, JEANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 21 ("[Oiptimal prudential controls correct
distortions that lead economic agents to take too much risk when there is a boom in capital
inflows."); Sean Hagan, United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Transfer of
Funds, at 45, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/20 (Dec. 1, 2000) ("[There are] circumstances
in which [capital] outflows . . .outstrip both the adjustment capacity of the member and the
amount of financing that can be provided.... [In such cases,] a country may have no choice but
to impose restrictions as a component of its overall adjustment programme."); ViTERBO, supra
note 4, at 156.

56

See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 157.

57

Nicolas E. Magud et al., Capital Controls: Alyth and Reakly - A Porfolio Balance Approach, at 7 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16805, Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6805.pdPnew window=1.
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domestic policymakers more room for monetary policy." They may also aim to
manage the allocation of those flows within the financial sector." In the decade
or so before the crisis, a growing number of countries had adopted such
policies," and they have become increasingly common in the years since the
, , 61
crisis.6
Although there is increasing agreement that domestic economies need to
manage capital inflows and outflows, policymakers face challenges in identifying
precisely when and how to do so. Thus, as one writer puts it, "the debate on
how to manage potentially destabilising capital inflows is once again at the centre
of public and scholarly attention." 62 Research to date on the effect of capital
controls and capital flow management measures remains inconclusive6 ' and
difficult to analyze. 64 The literature on the topic broadly indicates that such
policies can have a modest impact on the volume of capital flows 65 and a greater
impact on the composition of those flows. 6 This research leaves significant
uncertainty about the extent to which capital flow management measures can be
an effective way to protect or insulate an economy from financial or economic

58

See id.

s5 See VITRBO, supra note 4, at 155. Controls may be "country-specific" and sometimes essentially
permanent. Id. They may be imposed through direct regulation of transactions or through indirect
market-based mechanisms, like taxes. See id. at 158-59.
60

61

62

See JEANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 13; VITLRBo, supra note 4, at 156 (noting policies
in Brazil,

Colombia, Malaysia, and Thailand in the 1990s and similar policies in Iceland, South Korea, and
Taiwan in the years immediately preceding the global crisis).
See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 191 (noting policies in Iceland, Ukraine, Brazil, Peru, Indonesia,
South Korea, Thailand, Russia, and Argentina); JEANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 13-19 (discussing
policies adopted by Brazil, Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia in the wake of the crisis).
Moschella, supra note 22, at 8.

63

See Scorr & GEL .PERN, supra note 4, at 576, 1179-83 (discussing the literature on this question
and the cases of Chile and Malaysia); Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 4-6 (discussing
"mixed" evidence of the effectiveness of controls adopted by states in the 1990s).

64

See Engel, supra note 27, at 25 ("It is appropriate again to emphasize the limitations of the
empirical studies on the effectiveness of capital controls."); Ostry et al., supra note 27, at 5 ("Mt is
difficult to get the data to speak loudly on the issue.").
See Ostry et al., supra note 27, at 11-12; see also Engel, supra note 27, at 22 ("The empirical
literature tends to find that capital controls have weak effects on capital flows."); Forbes et al.,
supra note 53, at 1 (discussing research "showing that taxes on capital inflows can improve a
country's welfare by reducing negative feedback effects due to capital flow volatility or by
adjusting the terms-of-trade to shift consumption across periods").
See Engel, supra note 27, at 25 ("[here is evidence that controls can tilt the composition of
flows."); Ostry et al., supra note 27, at 5 ("The evidence appears to be stronger for capital controls
to have an effect on the composition of inflows than on the aggregate volume.").

65

66
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volatility." To make matters more complicated, the toolkit for affecting crossborder capital flows includes numerous instruments, including some that are not
primarily understood as capital flow management measures." Most notably,
prudential macroeconomic measures such as monetary and exchange rate
policies can have determinative impacts on the direction and volume of global
capital flows."
Furthermore, there are reasons to be concerned that capital flow
management policies might have deleterious or distortive effects within the
economy that employs them. In attempting to manage capital flows, a country
may negatively impact the availability or cost of external credit to itself and its
residents." Under some circumstances, such policies may also cause residents to
remove capital from the economy.n It is also possible that domestic
policymakers will rely on attempts to manage capital flows as a substitute for, or
in order to delay, macroeconomic or structural policy adjustments needed to
weather financial or economic shocks.72

67

See, for example, Mahvash S. Qureshi et al., Managing Capital Inflows: The Role of Capital Controls and
PrudentialPolicies, at 14 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17363, Aug. 2011),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl7363 ("Our findings suggest that capital controls and
various prudential policies can help reduce the riskiness of external liability structures and the
extent of risky foreign-currency lending in the economy."); Forbes & Warnock, sapra note 37, at 4
("We find no evidence that capital controls insulate an economy against capital flow waves.");
IMF, I beraliging Capital Flows and Managing Ouflows, supra note 9, at 34 ("[1]t appears that for
controls on outflows to have a chance at being effective, they need to be supported by coherent
macroeconomic policies."); see also Prasad & Rajan, supra note 8, at 166 ("[Tihe surge in overall
international capital flows, and the increasing sophistication of international investors, has made it
harder to shape financial flows into or out of a country."); VITiERBO, supra note 4, at n.119
(discussing the ongoing debate over controls and liberalization).

68

69

Seefor example, Jonathan D. Ostry et al., Managing CapitalInflows: What Tools to Use?, at 4, IMF Staff
Note no. 11/06, (Apr. 5, 2011) (discussing "how the macro and financial-stability rationales for
capital controls fit together; how prudential and capital control measures should be deployed
against various risks that inflow surges may bring; and specifically, how capital controls should be
designed to best meet the goals of efficiency and effectiveness"); JEANNE ET Ai., supra note 8, at 2
("It is desirable to negotiate an international agreement about which controls are appropriate and
which are not.'.
See,for exanple, Ostry et al., supra note 27, at 4 ("The tools [for managing capital inflows] include

70

fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rate policy, foreign exchange market intervention,
domestic prudential regulation, and capital controls."); id. at 6-8 (elaborating upon these policy
tools).
See Qureshi et al., supra note 67, at 15; Hagan, supra note 55, at 44.

71

See Hagan, supra note 55, at 44.

72

See id.
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B. Multilateral Dimensions
The recent crisis also illustrated that many of the determinants and effects
of capital flows in and out of an economy are external.7 3 Cross-border capital
flows are, by definition, international in nature: any movement of capital across a
border involves at least two countries. Increases in linkages between domestic
financial systems have made it easier for global capital to move among and
between economies in response to fast-changing economic or regulatory
environments. Circumstances and policies affecting capital flows in and out of
one nation can directly and swiftly affect the movement of capital in and out of
numerous other nations.74
For example, monetary policy in a systemically significant economy can
affect the global supply of credit; it can also impact the direction of capital flows,
effectively reallocating global liquidity." Stimulative monetary policy in the U.S.
and elsewhere has "provided an environment of cheap credit available for

73

See Ostry et al., supra note 27, at 10-11 (noting that widespread use of controls could impede
exchange rate adjustments needed to correct global imbalances and, potentially, "redirect flows to
countries less able to absorb them"); Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 2 ("[UJnlike the
cases prior to the global financial crisis, the debates are not simply about weighing trade-offs and
effectiveness of capital controls in managing the risks to financial stability associated with large
and volatile capital flows. Instead, they have become part of the hot button political issues of
'currency wars' and 'currency manipulation."'); see also IMF, Ijberaliging Capital Flows and Managing
Ouqlows, supra note 9, at 21 ("Greater attention needs to be paid to the multilateral effects of
policies, including liberalization of capital flows and changes in prudential measures. Capital flow
policies could have substantial multilateral effects, although the direction and size of such effects
is difficult to predict."); JEANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 ("fC]apital account policies (including
the accumulation of reserves) can be used to achieve exactly the same trade effects as tariffs on
imports and subsidies for exports. Thus, any conflict about international trade has a natural
tendency to spill over to capital flows, and vice versa."); id. at 33-36 (noting the multilateral
effects of an individual state's controls on inflows).

74

See Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that domestic policies designed to
manage capital movements can cause disruptive flows elsewhere); see also IMF, Liberaliing Capital
Flows and Managing Ouflows, supra note 9, at 17 ("Policy and economic developments in other
countries can significantly exacerbate the volatility of capital flows in any given country. Large,
internationally active, complex financial groups ... contribute to the rapid transmission of
external and sector-specific shocks to the wider financial system."); Pardee Center Task Force
Report, CapitalAccount Regulations and the Trading Sjstem: A Compatibility Review, at 2 (Mar. 2013),
available at http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2013/02/Pardee-CARs-and-Trade-TF-March2Ol3copy.pdfPPDF=car-task-force ("[Ilit may be necessary for nations to cooperate on 'both ends' of
capital flows in order to regulate cross-border finance in an efficient manner.").

75

See Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 1 ("Many emerging economies openly introduced
capital controls to mitigate the risks associated with volatile and large financial inflows from the
unconventional monetary expansion in advanced economies."). But see Forbes & Warnock, supra
note 37, at 1 (finding no support for "the widespread presumption that changes in global liquidity
or interest rates in a major economy, such as the United States, are important factors driving
surges in capital flows [independent of any effect on global risk and growth]").
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overseas reinvestment," resulting in significant and potentially destabilizing
inflows of capital to many emerging market economies." Such externalities can
cause or exacerbate misallocation of global liquidity or otherwise undermine
global stability, especially if risks are shifted to economies that have relatively less
capacity for managing capital flows."
Domestic policies adopted to manage capital movements may also distort
firm-level international investment decisions." They can also have broader
financial and economic effects on other states through exchange rates." They
may be employed, for example, to effectively limit appreciation of a currency's
exchange rate, benefitting the domestic exporting sector.o This is particularly
important against the backdrop of growing concerns that some emerging market
economies may be attempting to manipulate their exchange rates, perhaps in
violation of formal commitments.
In some circumstances, policies to control capital flows can produce
contagion effects. 82 If one state in or near financial distress imposes limits on
capital outflows, investors in other states that are in a comparable situation may
begin to fear that the second state will adopt similar limits and react accordingly,

76

Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 1 (noting also that "since the onset of the global
financial crisis, capital inflows-mostly portfolio flows-to emerging markets have been large and
volatile").

77

See, for example, De Paoli & Lipinska, supra note 28, at 2 ("If capital controls are set in an
uncoordinated fashion, they can have damaging implications for global risk-sharing and welfare.
Ultimately, when countries simultaneously and independently engage in such interventions in the
international flow of capital, not only global but individual welfare is adversely affected."); Forbes
et al., supra note 53, at 7 (finding that capital controls established in Brazil affect portfolio
investments not only in that country, but also in other countries in the region); Forbes et al., supra,
note 53, at 5 ("This renewed support for capital controls has also assumed that capital controls in
one country do not generate significant externalities on other countries. Our analysis shows,
however, that this may not be true.").

78

See Prasad & Rajan, supra note 8, at 164.

7

See, for example, Ostry et al., supra note 68, at 9 ("ITihe risk that controls are being imposed for
beggar-thy-neighbor reasons is genuine.").
SeeJlANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 21, 37-39.

8

81

82

See Moschella, supra note 22, at 8; see also VITERBO, supra note 4, at 289-315 (discussing tensions
related to exchange rates resulting from "global imbalances and undervalued currencies" and
efforts to address exchange rate manipulation caused by capital account policies or otherwise).
"Many countries-including Brazil, China, and India-are reported to have engaged in exchange
market intervention and enacted capital controls to contrast currency appreciation." Id. at 315. See
IMF, Bilateral Surveillance over Members' Polides Executive Board Deision, 1 15 (June 2007), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2007/pnO769.htm#decision (noting that restrictions
on capital flows can be employed to effectively manipulate exchange rates).
See, for example, Forbes et al., supra note 53, at 5.
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removing their investment from the second state, perhaps precipitating or
exacerbating a crisis there."
C. Summary
In the wake of the recent global crisis, there is heightened appreciation of
the need to manage cross-border capital flows and a new recognition that doing
so involves a wide array of domestic policies. Policymakers increasingly need
sound guidance on prudent approaches to liberalizing their capital accounts
while ensuring flexibility to manage flows in ways that preserve financial and
economic stability. 84 Furthermore, managing capital flows in one national or
regional economy may require adjustments and interventions elsewhere in the
world. This requires a meaningful degree of international coordination and
cooperation,85 the absence of which recently "contribute[d] to global
instability.""
III. THE FUND'S EVOLVING ROLE
Currently, there is no comprehensive multilateral framework for regulating
and coordinating domestic policies to manage capital flows." Instead, as the

83

8

a5

See Hagan,supra note 55, at 44 ("[I]nvestors may perceive [the imposition of capital controls] as a
signal that other countries may also rely on controls as a means of dealing with difficulties and, as
a result, the controls may have 'contagion' effects,").
See, for example, JEANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 ("[I]t would be desirable for a code of good
practices concerning capital account policies to be developed under the auspices of the IMF.");
PALAis-ROYAL INITIATIVE, supra note 54, at 11 ("The development of internationally agreed
guidelines in this area, covering both issues of disruptive inflows and outflows would be useful.").
See IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-Border CapitalFlows, supra note 4, at 7 ("The case for
collective action to address these challenges and thus preserve and extend the benefits of capital
flows is strong."); see also JEANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 ("[Under some circumstances,
unconstrained national actions can be collectively damaging."); Forbes et al., supra note 53, at 5
(advocating "international coordination or oversight of the use of capital controls to avoid a
'bubble thy neighbor' effect which could lead to retaliation across countries and reduce global
welfare"); Forbes & Warnock, supra note 37, at 6 (proposing "an important role for global
institutions and cross-country cooperation in reducing capital flow volatility"); Gochoco-Bautista
& Rhee, supra note 22, at 2 ("The need to establish multilaterally-consistent rules will become
more imperative since capital flows will continue to be a primary conduit for the transmission of
global shocks in the future.").

86

VITE'RBO, supra note 4, at 196.

87

See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 88 ("This notwithstanding, consensus on the need of a genuine
multilateral regime for investment protection remains a distant prospect."); id. at 89 (discussing
the failed OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment); PALAis-ROYAL INITIATIVE, supra note
54, at 4 ("There is no unified global governance structure to help ensure that major economic and
financial policy decisions made nationally, including exchange rate policies, are mutually
consistent and contribute to global stability."); IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-Border Capital
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following Section describes, those domestic policies are subject to an array of
bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade and investment agreements that reflect a
significant degree of heterogeneity and inconsistency." And those agreements
are, for the most part, only secondarily or incidentally concerned with crossborder capital flows." Against this backdrop, the Fund has increasingly asserted
a role in regulating its members' efforts to manage capital flows and in
influencing the multilateral determinants of those flows. This Section describes
the Fund's general mandate, the scope of its jurisdiction over capital
movements, and its evolving approach to engaging with members about their
policies regarding cross-border capital flows.
A. Scope of Authority
1. Generally.
The Fund was created in the wake of the Second World War to address
monetary and exchange rate instability, which had exacerbated conditions
leading to that conflict." It became one of the "pillars" of the international
economic legal framework, along with the World Bank and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." As set forth in its Articles of
Agreement, the Fund was designed to promote stable economic growth and
expansion of international trade among its members by, among other things,
promoting cooperation in monetary affairs and exchange rate stability."
Initially, the Fund's Articles committed its members to a fixed exchange
rate regime enforced by the Fund. In the 1970s that regime collapsed, and the
Fund's Articles were amended to broadly require that its members "collaborate
with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and
to promote a stable system of exchange rates."" Each member of the Fund now
Flows, supra note 4, at 3 ('I]here are no widely accepted 'rules of the game' for international
capital flows."); see also Elizabeth Broomfield, Reconciling IMF Rules and International Investment
Agreements: An Innovative Demgationfor CapitalControls, at 1 (Vale Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Int'l
Inv., FDI Perspective No. 78, Sep. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2206646 ("There is currently no universal framework governing capital
controls.").

88
89

See infra Section III.A.

90

See Ostry et al., Managing Capita/Inflows,supra note 68, at 19 (observing that these obligations can
constrain prudential policies regarding capital movements).
See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 59-60; Adam Feibelman, Europe and the Future ofInternationalMonetag

91

See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 56.

92

See

93

Id. art. IV,

Law, 22 TRANsNAT'L L. &CONTEMP.

PROBS. 115, 119-20 (2013).

Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. I, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement].

5 1.
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commits, among other things, to "(i) endeavor to direct its economic and
financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly economic
growth ... with due regard to its circumstances; [and] (ii) seek to promote
stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions and a
monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions."94
The Fund is charged with overseeing "the compliance of each member"
with these obligations pursuant to its bilateral surveillance with each member, 5
which it has historically conducted through an annual consultation process.96
The Fund's Executive Board has interpreted "a stable system of exchange rates"
to mean "systemic stability,"" and it has determined that "[s]ystemic stability is
most effectively achieved by each member adopting policies that promote its
own balance of payments stability and domestic stability."" In recent decades,
and especially since the most recent crisis, the Fund and its members have
increasingly recognized financial stability as a necessary component of domestic
and external stability.9 9 As a result, surveillance of members' financial policies
has become a central focus of the Fund's bilateral surveillance of its members'
compliance with their obligations under the Articles.
The Fund is also charged with "oversee[ing] the international monetary
system in order to ensure its effective operation,"o which provides the
jurisdictional basis for its multilateral surveillance. Whereas the Fund conducts
bilateral surveillance to enforce its members' compliance with their obligations
under the Fund's Articles, the distinct aim of multilateral surveillance is to
address threats to global stability that do not arise from its members' domestic
instability, but rather from the external or systemic effects of its members'
domestic policies. 0" The Fund's Executive Board has expressly found that

94

Id. Furthermore, members are obligated to provide the Fund with information necessary for it to
execute its responsibilities. Id. art. VIII, 5 5.

95 Id. art. IV, § 3(a).
96

RICHARD W. EDWARDS,JR., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 572-75 (1985).

97

IMF, Moderniging the Legal Framework for Surveillance-An Integrated Surveillance Decision: Revised
Proposed Decision, at 5 (July 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/
eng/2012/071712.pdf [hereinafter Integrated Surveillance Decision].
Id at 6. See id. ("In the conduct of their domestic economic and financial policies, members are
considered by the Fund to be promoting balance of payments stability when they are promoting
domestic stability. . . .The Fund in its surveillance will assess whether a member's domestic
policies are directed toward the promotion of domestic stability."); see also VITERBO, supra note 4,
at 69.

98

99

See generally Feibelman, supra note 1.

10

IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 92, art. IV,

5 3(a).

101 See IMF, Integrated Surveillance Decision, supranote 97, at 7-8.
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members have no formal obligations under the Articles to avoid such policies.10 2
Instead, the Fund's multilateral surveillance aims to encourage and influence its
members to promote external stability through their domestic policies. 103
Until recently, the scope of the Fund's multilateral surveillance was rather
limited, comprised primarily of its periodic Global Financial Stability Report and
World Economic Outlook reports.104 The recent global economic and financial
crisis generated a significant amount of internal and external assessment of why
the Fund had failed to help its members avoid default and why the crisis had
proved difficult to contain. 0 s One product of this assessment was significant
expansion of the scope of the Fund's multilateral surveillance. In 2012, the
Fund's Executive Board adopted a new Decision on surveillance that embraces a
robust mandate for multilateral surveillance and aims to closely integrate it with
its ongoing practice of bilateral surveillance. 0 '
In rearticulating its mandate to oversee the international monetary system,
the Fund's Executive Board noted that "symptoms of malfunction" in the
system include, among other things, "volatile capital flows, the excessive build
up or depletion of reserves, [and] imbalances arising from excessive or
insufficient global liquidity."10 ' It identified "exchange rate, monetary, fiscal, and
financial sector policies and policies respecting capital flows" as particularly
relevant to its multilateral surveillance.' The Fund's multilateral surveillance will

102

See id. at 7.

103

According to the Fund's Executive Board:
In the context of multilateral surveillance, the Fund may not and will not
require a member to change its policies in the interests of the effective
operation of the international monetary system. It may, however, discuss the
impact of members' policies on the effective operation of the international
monetary system and may suggest alternative policies that, while promoting
the member's own stability, better promote the effective operation of the
international monetary system.
Id.

104

See Feibelman,supra note 90, at 126.

105

See Independent Evaluation Office [IEO], IMF Performance in the Run-Up to Finandaland Economic
Crisis: IMF Surveillance in 2004-07, at vii, IEO Evaluation Report (2011) ("Warning member
countries about risks to the global economy and the buildup of vulnerabilities in their own
economies is arguably the most important purpose of IMF surveillance. This IEO evaluation
found that the IMF fell short in delivering on this key objective in the run-up to the financial and
economic crisis."); PAIAIS-ROYALE INITIATIVE, supra note 54, at 7 (noting the need to improve
both the substance and the impact of the Fund's surveillance in the wake of the crisis).

See generally IMF, IntegratedSurveillance Decision, supra note 97; see also Feibelman, supra note 90, 12433 (describing the process leading up to this development and the new mandate for multilateral
surveillance).
107 IMF, Integrated Surveillance Decision, supra note 97, at 7.
1o6

108

Id. at 8.
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also focus on global economic trends and, especially, on potential "spillovers
arising from policies of individual members that may ... undermin[e] global
economic and financial stability.""o'
2. Regarding capital movements.
Despite the Fund's mandate to oversee the international monetary system
and enforce its members' obligations to promote domestic stability, the scope of
its jurisdiction to engage with its members regarding their treatment of capital
flows is somewhat unclear. As a starting point, states' sovereignty over their
monetary affairs pursuant to public international law generally includes "[t]he
power to adopt exchange restrictions and capital controls."" 0 States ceded a
significant degree of their monetary sovereignty pursuant to the Fund's Articles,
but they retained much of it as well."'
The Articles expressly and significantly limit states' power to interfere with
"current payments." Article VIII provides that "no member shall, without the
approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and
transfers for current international transactions."1 12 Yet Article VI leaves to
members much greater power to restrict capital movements, 13 expressly
allowing them to "exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate
international capital movements."' 14 This provision reflects that, at the time of
the Fund's founding, it was generally assumed that member states would
exercise control over capital flows within and across their borders."' Thus, the
109

Id

110

VITERBO, supra note 4, at 151 (noting that "exchange restrictions and capital controls are at the
intersection where monetary, trade, and investment law meet").

See id.; id. at 237-39 (noting that, absent agreement to the contrary, "[s]tates are free to decide
whether to open their national economy to foreign investment or to restrict them").
112 IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 92, art. VIII, 2(a). See Hagan, supra note 55, at 17 ("Under
the Fund's principal approval policy, exchange measures that have been imposed for balance-of
payments reasons will be approved if they are temporary and do not discriminate among Fund
members."); VITERBO, supra note 4, at 169-74 (discussing exchange restrictions approved by the
Fund); see also VITERBO, at 174-75 (discussing the potential consequences for breaching this
obligation).
113 The distinction between current payments and capital transactions can be difficult to draw. See
VITERBO, supra note 4, at 167; IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 92, art. XXX(d) (listing
transactions that are treated as current payments under the Articles).
114 IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 92, art. VI, § 3. See IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross111

Border CapitalFlows, supra note 4, at 17-18.

J. M. Keynes, one of the IMF's
founding fathers, saw a role for capital controls under certain circumstances even as he said that
the post-war system should 'facilitate the restoration of international loans and credits for
legitimate purposes."'); VITERBO, supra note 4, at 179 ("[B]oth White and Keynes did not consider
capital account convertibility either necessary or desirable."), 178-82 (noting that capital controls

115 See Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 6 ("Early on,
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Fund's Articles create what one prominent writer describes as an asymmetry
between obligations regarding current payments and the lack of similar
obligations regarding cross-border capital flows."'
Notwithstanding this general asymmetry between the treatment of current
payments and that of capital movements, the Articles do effectively limit
members' ability to restrict capital flows to some extent."' For example, the
prohibition of restrictions on current payments under Article VIII covers
payments or transfers of investment income."' Thus, taken together, Articles
VIII and VI prohibit restrictions on outward capital flows that represent profits
of investment income (that is, current payments),"' but do not preclude
restrictions on repatriation of capital. Members are also prohibited from using
Fund resources "to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital," so the Fund
may "require that a member impose controls on capital movements in order to
prevent such use" if a member is receiving financial support from the Fund.'20
Finally, the Fund's Articles prohibit members from utilizing capital controls as a
strategy for manipulating their exchange rates to gain competitive advantage. 2'
Most notably, the Fund has determined that its members' obligations under
the Articles "to promote a stable system of exchange rates" extends to policies
affecting capital movements.'2 2 In other words, the Fund has jurisdiction over

116

117

were common after World War 11 and discussing the views of capital controls among the Bretton
Woods participants).
See VITIERBO, supra note 4, at 180 ("[The IMF structure is based on the dichotomy between
current payments and capital movements.").
See Hagan, supra note 55, at 10 ("[While the obligations established under the Fund's Articles
serve to liberalize investment flows in a number of important respects, it is not an international
investment agreement as such.").

18

"[Alpplying the definition of 'current payments' contained in the Articles, while the authorities
would be precluded from establishing a special exchange rate for the repatriation of profits, they
would be free to impose a special rate for the repatriation of the original capital or capital
appreciation." Hagan, supra note 55, at 15. See id. at 14 ("[Ljimitations on the ability of a resident
or non-resident, as the case may be, to purchase foreign exchange for the purpose of making the
payments or transfers in question constitute a restriction.").

119

See ViTFRBo, supra note 4, at 163 (noting that the prohibition of restrictions on payments does not
apply to regulation of "inward investment related payments and transfers") (emphasis in original).
IMF, IiberaligingCapital Flows and Managing Ouflows, supra note 9, at 7. See VITIERBo, suipra note 4,
at 168-69 (discussing the "folbligation to maintain a unified exchange rate system under Art. VII,
Section 3").

120

121 See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 184.

122

IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 92, art. IV, § 1. Members' freedom to regulate capital
movements "is not unlimited . . . with one such limitation being that members cannot exercise
their right to regulate international capital movements in a manner that would be inconsistent
with their obligations under Article IV." IMF, Liberaliging CapitalFlows and Managing Ouflows, supra
note 9, at 6-7.
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those policies to the extent that they implicate domestic or global stability.123
Furthermore, because global capital flows are "an important element of the
international monetary system,"1 24 the Fund has jurisdiction to consult with its
members about their capital account policies in the course of its multilateral
surveillance.
Nonetheless, the Articles were undoubtedly designed to limit to some
significant extent the Fund's jurisdiction over its members' policies regarding
capital movements. Reflecting this, the Fund's staff sought, unsuccessfully, in
the 1990s to amend its Articles to expressly extend its jurisdiction to capital
movements. The amendment under consideration at the time "would have
imposed upon members a general obligation to gradually liberalize their capital
account transactions, subject to certain safeguard provisions"' 25 and would have
authorized the Fund to enforce that obligation.
B. The Fund's Approaches to Capital Flows
1. Pre-crisis.
The fact that the Fund's Articles reserve members' freedom to "exercise
such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements" 2
reflects the view of the Fund's architects that such controls can be beneficial
under some circumstances.12 7 In the years between the amendments to the
Fund's Articles in the 1970s and the financial crises of the late 1990s, however,
the Fund increasingly embraced and helped to advance a consensus that
liberalization of capital movements was a key component to promoting

See IMF, 1IberaliingCapitalFlows and Managing Outflows, supra note 9, at 7 ("[The Fund focuses on
capital flow issues both as an integral part of bilateral surveillance and in the context of its
responsibility to oversee the international monetary system (that is, multilateral surveillance).").
124
VITERBO, supra note 4, at 183-84 (discussing the Fund's 1977 Decision on the newly amended
Article IV, which acknowledged that capital flows may be a topic of concern in Fund surveillance,
and noting that capital flows were generally included in Article IV consultations thereafter).
125 Id. at 187. See id. at 186-89 (discussing the effort to amend articles during the 1990s); see also IMF,
The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-Border Capital Flows, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing efforts to amend
the Fund's Articles in 1997 to give the Fund clear jurisdiction over capital movements); id. at 19
(noting that the proposed amendment would have required liberalization but provided safety
valves-transitional rules and temporary restrictions of huge outflows); id. at 19-20 ("fI1his
reform effort [of the 199 0s] did not come to fruition, largely due to the reluctance of key
members to cede sovereignty in this important area, coupled with the belief held by many that the
Asian crisis . . . had its roots in premature capital account liberalization.").
126
See sources cited supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
123

127

See discussionsupra note 115 and accompanying text.
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economic growth and development.1 28 During this period, the Fund generally
encouraged members to remove existing restrictions on capital flows and
discouraged the use of capital controls to address financial or economic
instability.129 It was toward the end of that period that the Fund sought to amend
its Articles to expand its jurisdiction over capital movements.' 30
During the financial crises of the 1990s, however, as the potentially
destabilizing effects of capital flows became clearer, the Fund grew more
cautious about capital account liberalization."' During this period, the Fund staff
developed an approach that generally favored liberalization of capital flows in
tandem with other institutional reforms, especially improvements in the
regulation and supervision of the financial sector. 132 It occasionally approved the
use of controls by members obtaining financial support from the Fund. 133 In
128

129

130

See Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 1 (noting that in the mid-1990s the Fund "had
been on the verge of amending Article VIII to include capital account convertibility"); id. at 7
("The bias for financial liberalization and against the use of capital controls was increasingly the
norm from the 1980s up to the Asian financial crisis, as the IMF placed emphasis on the benefits
to developing countries from greater capital mobility, with less attention on the attendant risks of
cross-border capital flows."); see also Prasad & Rajan, supra note 8, at 149 (noting the abandoned
effort to amend the Fund's Articles in the 199 0s, which would have made "liberalization of capital
movements one of the purposes of the IMP); VirERBo, supra note 4, at 189-90 (noting that the
Fund had been strongly in favor of liberalization in the 1990s).
See Gallagher & Tian, supra note 8, at 2 ("It has been well established that the International
Monetary Fund,. . . though no longer wholly opposed, was generally skeptical for the regulation
of cross-border financial flows from the 19 80s to the run up to the global financial crisis.").
"During this era, the IMF excluded the use of controls from its list of appropriate capital flow
management policies," based on concerns that they are ineffective, "an obstacle to necessary
macroeconomic adjustments," and can cause "negative spill-over and contagion effects."
Moschella, supra note 22, at 8; see also id. at 12 (discussing the Fund's negative view of Chile's
controls on capital, which it deemed "incompatible with the still-desirable goal of capital account
liberalization").
See discussion supra note 125 and accompanying text.

131 See JEANNE E7TAL., supra note 8, at 47 ("After the onset of the Asian financial crisis, the IMF's
approach to capital flows took a more nuanced turn."); Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22,
at 1 (noting that the Fund's experience with the Asian financial crisis contributed to the end of
efforts to amend the Fund's Articles); VITERBo, supra note 4, at 190 (discussing the Fund's "more
99
cautious approach to capital account liberalization" after the crises of the 1 0s).
132 See JEANNt ET AL., supra note 8, at 47 ("Effective capital account liberalization was Ithereafterl a

133

question of proper sequencing."); IMF, 1iberaliing CapitalFlows and Aanaging Oufflows, supra note
9, at 16 ("Staff advice has tended to rely to a large extent on the so-called 'integrated approach' to
liberalization, which received considerable support at an informal Board seminar in 2001, but was
never formally adopted as the Fund's policy framework."); VITIERBo, supra note 4, at 190 (noting
that the Fund embraced a structured approach to liberalization during this period).
See Moschella, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that, during this period, the Fund was still skeptical
about controls on outflows, but increasingly embraced controls inflows); VITIERtBO, supra note 4,
at 184 ("[T]he IMF has often supported members' economic programmes that included controls
on capital inflows . . . and on capital outflows.").
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2005, the Fund's Independent Evaluation Office released an important report
on the Fund's approach to capital account liberalization and capital flows during
the period between 1994 and 2004.134 The report confirmed the Fund's shift
toward a more cautious approach to liberalization after the crises of the 1990s."'
It also observed that, although "the IMF staff was in principle opposed" to the
use of capital controls, the Fund's staff "became much more accommodating of
the use of capital controls over time, albeit as a temporary, second-best
instrument.""' The report raised concerns, however, that the Fund's overall
approach to capital account policies and capital flows was ad hoc and sometimes
inconsistent, and it called for a clarification of the Fund's approach at the
institutional level. 37
A 2007 Executive Board Decision broadly rearticulated and clarified the
Fund's approach to bilateral surveillance and focused more heavily on capital
flows than the 1977 Decision it replaced.13 The 2007 Decision noted that the
Fund's surveillance of members' policies "will always include an evaluation of
the developments in the member's balance of payments, including the size and
sustainability of capital flows."' 39 And it identified capital management policies
designed to impact balance of payments as "developments ... which would
require thorough review and might indicate the need for discussion with a
member."' 4 0 Although the framework for surveillance articulated in the 2007
Decision was eclipsed by the global financial crisis, which began to unfold in
that year,14 1 the Integrated Surveillance Decision that soon replaced it also
focused expressly on capital flows.' 42
2. Post-crisis.
The recent global crisis was a transformative event for the Fund in various
ways, most notably with regard to its mandate for multilateral surveillance

134

See generally lEO, The IMF's Approach to Capital Account liberali.ation, IEO Evaluation Report
(2005). The 2005 IEO report "assessed the level of IMF support for capital account liberalization
and capital controls in the wake of the financial crises in the 1990s." Gallagher & Tian, supra note

8, at 5.
135

See IEO, The IMF's Approach to Capital Account Liberalization, supra note 134, at 3-4.

136

Id. at 5.

137

See id. at 5-7.

13s

See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 184-85.

139 IMF, BilateralSurveillanceover Members' Policies Executive Board Decision, supra note 81,

12.

M4 Id.T15.
141 See Feibelman, supra note 90, at 124-33 (describing post-crisis review of the 2007 Decision
culminating in a new Decision).
142 See IMF, IntegratedSurveillance Decision, supra note 97, at 8.
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discussed above.' 43 By highlighting the potential of capital flows to be a source
of both domestic and systemic instability,1 " the crisis also led to a significant
shift in the Fund's approach to capital movements.145 Among other things, the
crisis largely confirmed growing concerns within the Fund and elsewhere about
the liberalization of policies affecting capital movements."' As discussed above,
it also revealed the complex interplay of policies affecting capital movements,1'
highlighting their multilateral dimension.'4 8
Furthermore, the crisis underscored the lack of any comprehensive
international, multilateral framework for governing and coordinating domestic
policies regarding cross-border capital movements. As a Fund staff paper noted:
Various parts of the membership are taking divergent approaches to surging
capital inflows-among other things, currency intervention, taxes, reserve
requirements, and prudential measures. The appropriateness of these
responses, both for the member itself and for the wider global good (e.g.,
they may only divert flows to other countries or exacerbate other
imbalances), have not been fully evaluated. Yet doing so is nearly impossible
in the absence of an institutional line and consistent framework.149
It concluded: "[i]n the aftermath of the global crisis, and especially now with
resurgent capital flows requiring a considered policy response, it is not tenable
for the Fund to remain on the sidelines of a debate so central to global
economic stability."' The Fund was also encouraged by its members in the G20 as well as other commentators to play a more central regulatory role in
addressing capital movements."s'

143

See discussion supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.

144 See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 8-10 (noting that the Palais-Royal report, supra note 54, identified
"four sources of instability under the current international monetary system": global imbalances,
capital flows, exchange rate fluctuations, and reserve accumulation).
145
146

See Moschella, supra note 22, at 2 ("[Slince the burst of the global financial crisis in 2007, the Fund
has significantly revised its previous policy stance on [controls].")
See sources cited supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; see alsoJEANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at
48-49 (noting the Fund's heightening concern about capital flows and openness to capital
controls in the wake of the recent crisis).

147
148

149

See discussion supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.
IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-BorderCapitalFlows, supra note 4, at 3-4.

15o Id. at 3. See also Gallagher & Tian, supra note 8, at 4 (proposing that policymakers at the Fund were
motivated to shift the institutional position on capital controls "in hopes that it would revive
interest in the IMF, given that global regard for the institution had waned significantly").
151

See, for example, IMF, IjberaliingCapital Flows and Managing Ouflows, supra note 9, at 4 ("The IMFC
and the G-20 have called for work by the Fund on the management of capital flows, in
connection with ongoing efforts to improve the functioning of the international monetary
system."); see alsoJEANNE ETAL., supra note 8, at 2 ("[The [IMF] was asked by its shareholders to
address the question of whether there is a need for globally agreed 'rules of the road' for
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To some extent, the recent shift in the Fund's approach occurred ad hoc,
as a product of its efforts to help restore and preserve stability in the wake of the
global financial crisis.152 As the crisis unfolded, it increased its focus on capital
flows in its bilateral and multilateral surveillance of its members' policies. 5 3
Perhaps most notably, Fund programs in Iceland, Central and Eastern Europe,
and Cyprus included controls on outward flows.154 In the aftermath of the crisis,
the Fund also supported controls on inward flows in some emerging
economies.5 s
During this period, the Fund's staff prepared a series of papers"6 on capital
managing capital flows."); Statement by the United States Secretary of the Treasury Timothy
Geithner in the Twenty-Third Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and Financial
Committee (Apr. 16, 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2011/imfc/
statement/eng/usa.pdf (encouraging the Fund to strengthen its surveillance of capital flows);
PAI.Als-ROYALIE INITIATIVE, supra note 54, at 11 ("The IMF should establish a more complete
analytic framework on capital flows, both in capital exporting and importing countries, in light of
the experience gained over the last two decades that have been characterised by large and volatile
capital flows.").
152 See IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-Border Capital Flows, supra note 4, at 21 ("Controls on
capital outflows have been included in economic programs supported by the Fund in capital
account crises where large outflows have threatened to overwhelm emergency financing
(including under Fund arrangements) and deplete international reserves."). Further,
"[t]he prominent role of the Fund in the implementation of the derogation
provisions reflects the fact that the Fund is charged with both assisting
countries in the design of programmes that address balance of payments
problems and providing the financial assistance that is necessary to support
these programmes.... [W]hen a country faces a balance of payments crisis
there is a very close relationship between issues relating to the need for
restrictions, the degree of economic adjustment and the amount of external
financing."
Hagan, supra note 55, at 52.
See IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-Border Capital Flows, supra note 4, at 24-34 (discussing
enhanced Fund surveillance of policies affecting capital flows after the crisis); Gochoco-Bautista
& Rhee, supra note 22, at 7 ("[lit was not until after the GFC and the rebound of capital inflows
that the IMF appears to have given renewed thought to the issue of how to manage capital
inflows."); see also IMF, Factsheet: Vulnerability Indicators, available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/exr/facts/vul.htm (noting that the Fund has begun to give greater attention to capital flows as
a "vulnerability indicator" for its members).
154 See Scorr & G EuPsAN [19th ed.], supra note 4, at 658; Gallagher & Tian, supra note 8, at 2 ("Most

153

surprising to many was the IMF's strong support of the use of capital controls on outflows in
Iceland as part of that country's post crisis stand-by-agreement."); Moschella, supra note 22, at 2.
155 See Gallagher & Tian, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that "[i]n the wake of the crisis, the IMF surprised

156

many observers by openly embracing capital controls" on inflows in a number of countries such
as Brazil and South Korea). See also discussion supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
See generally id.; IMF, Liberaliing Capital Flows and Managing O7flows, supra note 9; IMF, I be
Multilateral Aspects of Policies Affecting Capital Flows (Oct. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/101311.pdf; IMF, Recent Experiences in Managing
Capital Inflows-Cross-Cutting Themes and Possible Pocy Framework (Feb. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/021411a.pdf.
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flows "to equip the Fund with an up-to-date and operational framework for
policy advice on liberalizing capital flows and on the management of capital
outflows" and "to inform policy discussions with and advice to Fund
members.""' In this process, the Fund's staff amplified its views on the need for
careful, integrated liberalization of policies affecting capital inflows,"5 s and fully
embraced the idea that capital management measures can be crucial tools for
crisis containment "without compromising the overall process of
liberalization."' The Fund's staff also acknowledged that policies designed to
manage capital movements are potentially discordant with the existing terrain of
bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements.160
The efforts within the Fund to improve its surveillance of capital flows
culminated in an "institutional view" articulated by the Fund's staff and
subsequently endorsed by its Executive Board.'' Not surprisingly, it embraces
and expands upon the Fund's "integrated approach" to liberalization,1 6 1 which
ties certain institutional developments to particular types of capital flows and
proposes a sequence for liberalizing the various types of flows. 63 States are more
likely to experience benefits of liberalizing capital flows if they "have achieved
certain levels of financial and institutional development" and if liberalization is

157

15s

159

160

161

IMF, LiberaliZing Capital Flows and Managing Ou flows, supra note 9, at 1; id. at 7 (noting that the
discussion in the paper is "not intended to provide guidance on the scope of members'
obligations under Article IV").
See IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-Border Capital Flows, supra note 4, at 20 (describing the
"[clurrent surveillance practice"); see also IMF, JiberaliingCapitalFlows and Managing Ouflows, supra
note 9, at 26-33 (discussing the potential benefits of liberalization to China and India in
particular).
IMF, Liberalizing Capital Flows and Managing Ouflows, supra note 9, at 1. See id. at 5 ("mhe
temporary reimposition of [capital flow management measures] on capital outflows can be useful
mainly in crisis or near crisis conditions but only as a supplement to other policies in response to
large outflows typically associated with crises."); id. at 35 ("Once a country has substantially
liberalized capital flows, a certain degree of capital outflow volatility is normal, and does not in
and of itself call for the use of [management measures].").
See IMF, Ilberalizing CapitalFlowsand Managing Ouflows, supra note 9, at 8 ("[Tlhese agreements in
many cases do not provide... proper sequencing of liberalization."); IMF, The Fund's Role
Regarding Cross-BorderCapital Flows, supra note 4, at 24 ("The existing configuration of agreements
presents particular challenges for the Fund, including through its role in providing financing to
address capital account crises (e.g., these may be triggered by premature liberalization)."). The
potential application of trade and investment treaties to capital flow management measures is
discussed infra Section IV.A.
IMF, An Institutional View, supra note 19. See Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 7. The
new view was "incorporated into a Staff Guidance note in 2013 and [is] intended to guide official
IMF policy advice on the matter." Gallagher & Tian, supra note 8, at 4.

162

IMF, An InstitutionalView, supra note 19, at 14.

163

See id.
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accompanied by "sound fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies."164
Similarly, the risks of liberalization are greater if states have not achieved a basic
level of development, especially with regard to financial regulation and
supervision.' In particular, the Fund's view proposes that members liberalize
inflows of foreign direct investment before liberalizing related outflows or other
longer-term flows or attempting to develop capital markets.166
The more notable aspect of the Fund's new institutional view on capital
flows is its unequivocal assertion of the need to manage them and its embrace of
a broad range of capital flow management measures, ranging from general
macro-prudential policies (like monetary policy) to aggressive controls on
outflows. 167 It envisions that to manage capital inflows and outflows, its member
states should under most circumstances rely on general prudential measures,
especially monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies,' which can impact the
volume and direction of capital flows.'16
The Fund's view expressly recognizes, however, that states may sometimes
need to resort to more aggressive measures to manage capital flows. Given the
continued skepticism at the Fund and elsewhere that controls can significantly
impact the volume of flows,'70 however, the Fund's new approach embraces
aggressive capital controls "only as a last resort policy tool.""' They may be
necessary, for example, if there is not sufficient "room" for general prudential
measures, if those measures would take too much time, or if flows threaten
systemic instability.'72 According to the Fund's new institutional view, if such
measures are necessary, they should be limited, non-discriminatory, and
temporary,"' and they should generally be accompanied by macroeconomic
policies designed to address "fundamental causes of the crisis." 74

164 Id. at 12.

165

See id.

166

See id.

167 See id. at 16-29.
168 See id. at 17-18 (proposing policies that could respond to surging inflows, including "lowering

interest rates," "fiscal tightening," and "allowing the currency to strengthen"); id. at 25 (noting
that "macroeconomic, structural, and financial policies" should be the first line of defense against
capital outflows).
169 See discussion supra note 65 and infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
170 See Moschella, supra note 22, at 9.
171 Id. at 10.

172

See IMF, An InstituionalView, supra note 19, at 18.

173 See id. at 20.

174 Id. at 26. See id. at 19 (asserting that aggressive capital flow management measures should not
substitute for necessary adjustment in macroeconomic policies).
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Finally, in addition to providing these guidelines for its members' capital
flow management policies, the Fund's institutional view acknowledges the
multilateral factors affecting global capital flows and asserts its authority to try to
influence its members' policies."' Among other things, the Fund aims to identify
and contain spillovers from an individual members' domestic economy,"' to
help coordinate the policies of source and recipient states," and to promote
more consistency among the various international agreements affecting states'
policies regarding capital flows."' As discussed below, these efforts will be a core
and challenging component of the Fund's multilateral surveillance.
Although there had been ambivalence and episodic support within the
Fund for attempts to manage capital flows over recent decades,"' the new
institutional view represents a clear shift from the institution's pre-crisis official
position. Manuela Moschella considers the Fund's evolving approach to capital
flows as a case study of "ideational change" among policymakers.'" According
to her, the Fund's "incremental" change in response to crisis has been slower
than the literature would predict,"' due in part to the constraints of the Fund's
legal framework, including uncertainty about the scope of its jurisdiction over
capital flows.' 82
In any event, Kevin Gallagher and Yuan Tian have shown that the Fund
has not simply articulated a new institutional view but has changed its regulatory
behavior as well. Since the crisis, the Fund has voiced considerably more
support for capital controls in its surveillance of members' policies," especially

176

See id. at 30 (noting the Fund's responsibility to ensure the stability of the international monetary
system and the threat that volatile capital flows pose to that system).
See id. at 32; see also id. at 29 (discussing contagion as a potential spillover effect).

177

See id. at 28; id. at 16 (noting "push and pull factors" affecting capital flows).

178

See id. at 33.
"[I]he current ideational stance within the Fund presents broad continuities with past policy
ideas." Moschella, supra note 22, at 10-11 (discussing gradualists at the Fund with regard to capital
flows since the early 1980s).

175

179

180

See generaly id; see also Gallagher & Tian, supra note 8, at 2-4 (discussing the literature on the crisis
and "the shift of discourse at the IMF [about capital controls]").

181 See Moschella, supra note 22, at 2-3 (arguing that "ideational change [at the Fund regarding capital
controls] was slower and more incremental than most of the literature claims it to be even after a
major shock').
182
See id. at 12-13 (arguing that the IMF Articles of Agreement provide flexibility for, as well as
constrain, the Fund's evolving approach to capital controls).
183
See Gallagher & Tian, supra note 8, at 20-23; see also Joseph P. Joyce & Ilan Noy, The IMF and
Liberali.Zationof Capital Flows, 16 Ri~v. INT'L ECON. 413 (2008) (examining the correlation between
Fund programs and capital account liberalization); Rathin Roy & Raquel Almeida Ramos, IMF
Article IV Reports: An Analysis of Poliy Recommendations (Int'l Policy Center of Inclusive Growth,
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where their economies have become vulnerable to economic or financial
crises.' 84 Their research also shows that the Fund is less supportive of
liberalization when members have significant current account deficits.' As one
writer puts it, "[flor an organisation that has historically opposed capital
controls, even trying in the mid-1990s to amend its Articles of Agreement to
allow it to promote capital account liberalization, the current position is puzzling
and deserves scholarly attention."'
In sum, the Fund's newly articulated institutional view aims to be a road
map for its members' domestic policies regarding capital flows. It marks an
incremental but noteworthy shift in the institution's approach to liberalizing
capital flows, part of a new, somewhat more cautious and nuanced approach to
liberalization in general,' as well as a more dramatic shift toward embracing
direct capital controls as a potential policy tool. Furthermore, the Fund's new
view should be viewed as a significant assertion of its jurisdiction to help manage
global capital flows pursuant to its mandate to ensure the stable functioning of
the international monetary system. In this regard, the Fund's evolving
engagement with its members regarding capital movements reflects its ambition
to play a more assertive regulatory role in the international financial system more
generally.
IV. CHALLENGES
The Fund faces a number of challenges as it attempts to play a more
assertive role in regulating and coordinating its members' policies regarding
capital flows. These include "perceived ambiguity in its Articles, divergent
attitudes among members, and the legacy of a failed attempt to confront the

184

185
186

187

Working Paper No. 86, Feb. 2012) (studying Article IV reports in 2010 to determine whether the
Fund had changed its policy advice after the crisis).
See Gallagher & Tian, supra note 8, at 28 ("We can conclude from the regression results that the
financial crisis has a significant influence on the IMF's decision about level of support for capital
control[s].... [A]s the economy becomes more vulnerable, the level of support for capital
controlls] increases."). Mention of controls in Article IV reports is "significantly correlated with
the domestic banking-sector credit"-as credit in that sector grows, controls are more likely to be
mentioned, presumably reflecting greater vulnerability. Id. at 26.
See id. at 26.
Moschella, supra note 22, at 10-11 (describing three phases of "ideational change" at the Fund
concerning capital controls). "In summary, before the global financial crisis burst, there existed
[within the Fund] strategic and well-positioned advocates endowed with alternative ideas." Id at
12.
"[A]lthough the current Fund's rethink on controls is timid in light of the empirical evidence
collected as the result of the latest crisis, it certainly signals that the IMF is reevaluating its
assumptions about the costs and benefits of liberalisation. This leads the Fund into potentially
uncharted territories." Id. at 15.
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issue in the late 1990s."1" This section explores, in particular, potential tensions
with other international legal regimes, concerns about the substance of the
Fund's new approach to capital flows, and ongoing challenges for the Fund in
improving the traction of its surveillance and related activities.
A. Coordinating Legal Domains
Although nations vary widely in their openness to foreign trade and
investment,189 most have increasingly liberalized their policies on trade and
investment in recent decades, often pursuant to international agreements. Taken
together, these agreements reflect a heterogeneous approach to capital flows."
As discussed below, the Fund's new institutional approach to capital flows and
the growing academic consensus it reflects are in tension with some of these
other legal regimes. As Viterbo notes, some of the policies that the Fund and
other commentators believe should be available to policymakers for managing
capital flows "may be limited by the obligations contained in previously
undertaken trade and investment treaties." 19'
Most international agreements touching upon capital movements have
been designed to remove or limit regulatory actions that might impede the free
flow of capital across borders. The Code of LiberaliZation of CapitalMovements (the
"Code"),'1 92 promulgated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD),'93 is the most significant of these. It is a formal
18

IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross Border CapitalFlows, supra note 4, at 3. Reevaluation of capital
controls within the Fund was "hotly contested," with the "BRICS countries leading an efforts [sic]
to grant the most policy space possible for emerging markets to regulate capital flows." Gallagher
& Tian, supra note 8, at 4.

189

See VITaRBO, supra note 4, at 239 (describing four models of relative openness to investment).

190

See Broomfield, supra note 87, at 1 (noting "the different approaches taken by various
international organizations and many international investment agreements"); Hagan, supra note
55, at 1-2 (noting the variety of provisions in international agreements affecting capital flows);
VTIRo, supra note 4, at 88 (noting the lack of "inter-treaty coherence" and potentially
conflicting obligations in agreements related to capital flows).

191 VITERBO, supra note 4, at 281. Viterbo discusses this tension as an example of "norm conflict." Id
at 41-47.
192
OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/inv/investment-policy/CapitalMovements WebEnglish.pdf [hereinafter OECD Code].
193 The OECD was formed by European states in the wake of the Second World War to implement
the Marshall Plan. See Histor, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2014). It has since expanded to 34 members, including the U.S., Canada, and Japan, and a few
large emerging economies such as Mexico, Turkey, and South Korea. See Members and partners,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). Its
mission, broadly defined, is to help its members and other governments identify and adopt
policies that promote economic development and social welfare. See Hagan, supra note 55, at 18,
("Under the OECD Convention, OECD members are required to 'pursue their efforts to reduce
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agreement among its members with the general goal of "eliminating exchange
and capital controls."' 94 Pursuant to the Code, OECD members have agreed to
"progressively abolish between one another ... restrictions on movements of
capital to the extent necessary for economic co-operation."' In particular,
members commit to "grant any authorisation required for the conclusion or
execution of transactions and transfers specified" under the Code."' These
include direct investments, liquidation of direct investments, certain real estate
transactions, and the issuance, sales, and purchases of securities and collective
investment securities.' The Code provides that other transactions, generally
those with shorter maturities, can be restricted."'
The Code allows a member to temporarily derogate from its commitment
to liberalize capital movements "[i]f its economic and financial situation justifies
such a course," if adherence would "result in serious economic and financial
disturbance," or "[i]f the overall balance of payments of a Member develops
adversely at a rate and in circumstances . . . which it considers serious.""' Such

194

195

196

or abolish obstacles to the exchange of goods and services and current payments and maintain
and extend the liberalisation of capital movements."') (quoting Convention on the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, art. 2(d), Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728). To that
end, the OECD adopts decisions, recommendations, standards, and models on various topics of
regulatory concern; in some cases, the OECD facilitates international agreements among its
members.
OECD, Fortj Years' Experience with the OECD Code of liberalisation of CapitalMovements, supra note
27, at 3.
OECD Code, supra note 192, art. 1(a). The Code "eas[es] restrictions that discriminate based on
residency." IMF, Liberalying CapitalFlows and Managing Ouflows, supra note 9, at 19. The Code also
provides that "[m]embers shall endeavour to extend the measures of liberalisation to all members
of the [IMFj." OECD Code, supra note 192, art. 1(d). The OECD has recently allowed nonmembers to join the Code. See OECD, OECD Invites Non Members to Join the Codes with Full Rights
and Duties (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/Codesliberalisation-governance.pdf.
OECD Code, supra note 192, art. 2(a).

197 See OECD Code, supra note 192, annex A; Hagan, supra note 55, at 19-20 (noting that the

198

provisions cover the transfer of proceeds from liquidating investments as well as from investment
income); see also id at 19 ("Mhe investment liberalization obligations of the Capital Movements
Code extend not only to the ability of non-residents to make investments in a host country, but
also to the ability of a country's residents to make investments abroad."); id. at 23 (noting that the
Code "covers both underlying transactions and associated transfers" and that "[tlhe coverage of
underlying transactions is particularly necessary in the case of inflows, where restrictions are
normally imposed at that level").
See OECD Code, supra note 192, art. 2(b)(iv) (referring to "List B" transactions); Hagan, supra
note 55, at 22 ("The generous treatment of these transactions is attributable to their volatility and,
accordingly, their potentially adverse impact on the macroeconomic and balance-of-payments
stability of OECD members.").

199

OECD Code, supra note 192, arts. 7(a)-(c). See IMF, Liberaligng Capital Flows and Managing
Ouflows, supra note 9, at 8 (noting that prudential restrictions can be introduced under the Code).
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derogations require notice to the OECD Council and are subject to review but
not prior approval.20 0 It is also possible that, under some circumstances,
principles of public international law may support derogation from obligations
under the Code.20'
Members of the European Union (EU) have also agreed to dramatically
liberalize the treatment of capital movements within the EU. In 1958, the Treaty
of Rome provided that "the internal market shall comprise an area without
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured." 202 In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty established the free
movement of capital as one of the fundamental freedoms of the EU,203
prohibiting members from restricting capital movements among themselves or
between members and non-member states. 204 Like the OECD, these treaties
allow EU members to take some restrictive measures to address acute crises or
balance-of-payments difficulties, but these exceptions are not allowed to
members in the Euro zone.205
Many nations have also made formal international commitments regarding
capital flows through bilateral or regional investment treaties. 206 These treaties

200

Furthermore, "[n]othing in this Code shall be regarded as altering the obligations undertaken
[pursuant to] the Articles of Agreement of the [IMFj or other existing multilateral international
agreements." OECD Code, supra note 192, art. 4. See Broomfield, supra note 87, at 2 (discussing
the deference of GATT and NAFTA to Fund assessment of members' restrictions on capital
movements).
See Hagan, supra note 55, at 22 ("[Ihe OECD Codes provide that a member may take the

initiative to introduce restrictions for balance of payments reasons, but that they must be
promptly notified to the OECD, where they are examined.").
201 See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 260-71 (discussing the possibility that doctrines of public
international law would allow for derogation in the absence of an expressly agreed safeguard); see
also id. at 195 (noting that the European Court of Justice has ruled that European Union
members' investment treaties must allow for prudential controls).
202
Consolidated Version of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union art. 26(2), Mar.
203

30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
See id. art. 63; Waibel, supra note 23, at 12.

205

See IMF, Liberalizing Capital Flows and Managing Oulows, supra note 9, at 6 (noting that members of
the European Union, not all of which are within the Eurozone, have agreed to "generally
prohibit[] all restrictions on the movement of capital").
See TFEU, supra note 202, arts. 66, 143, 144; see also IMF, Liberaing Capital Flows and Managing

206

Ou
supra note 9, at 8 ("EU members outside of the euro area may additionally resort to
restrictions on capital movements when faced with balance of payments difficulties under certain
circumstances.").
See generaly Broomfield, supra note 87 (noting provisions of international investment treaties that

204

flows,

limit restrictions on cross-border capital movements); see also Hagan, supra note 55, at 28-38
(discussing the design and scope of provisions in international investment treaties that limit
restrictions on cross-border capital movements); VITERBO, supra note 4, at 84-89 (describing
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are directed at protecting foreign investors in host countries.207 Because the
movement of capital across national borders and jurisdictional lines is a sine qua
non of international investment, 208 these agreements generally include
commitments to avoid restrictions on inward investments and related
transfers.209
Until recently, most international investment treaties, especially bilateral
treaties, did not allow for derogation from these commitments to address
balance-of-payments difficulties or financial crises.210 It appears that such treaties
increasingly do allow for derogation; some allow for derogation to address acute
balance-of-payments problems, others allow it to resolve financial instability, and
still others allow it for either reason.21 ' But some agreements still do not include

207

208

209

210

different types of international investment agreements and noting that there are over 2,500 such
agreements in force).
See Hagan, supra note 55, at 28 ("Illnvestment protection is one of the central objectives (and, in
some cases, the only objective) of bilateral and regional investment agreements.... [These
agreements normally require a host country to liberalize the full range of investments made by the
treaty party's investors.').
See, for example, Waibel, supra note 23, at 2 ("The growth of international investment depends on
capital accounts that are at least partly open.... [The transferability of financial assets] is an
essential ingredient for the proper operation of investments.'); see also sources cited sipra note 2
and accompanying text.
See, for example, Hagan, supra note 55, at 1 ("By establishing a host country's obligation to permit
the payment, conversion and repatriation of amounts relating to an investment, a transfer
provision ensures that, at the end of the day, a foreign investor will be able to enjoy the financial
benefits of a successful investment."); Waibel, supra note 23, at 2 (arguing that free transfer clauses
in international investment treaties "[have] led to a patchwork liberalization of the capital
account"); VITA1Bo, supra note 4, at 86-87 (noting that free transfer provisions "are contained in
all [investment treaties]" but "differ greatly in scope"), 239-45 (discussing the difficulty in
defining the scope of "investments" covered by such agreements); IMF, Liberaligng Capital Flows
and Managing Ou7flows, supra note 9, at 8; Hagan, supra note 55, at 28 ("[I]hese agreements serve to
liberalize inward, but not outward, investments, in contrast to the OECD Codes, which liberalize
both.").
See, for example, Broomfield, supra note 87, at 1 ("[International investment agreements], and

especially bilateral investment treaties (BITs)--crafted primarily to protect investors-typically do
not allow for the imposition of restrictions on capital outflows associated with foreign
investments for balance-of-payments reasons."); Waibel, supra note 23, at 19 (noting that "many
multilateral treaties" include balance-of-payments safeguards while "only a minority" of bilateral
investment treaties do so); Hagan, supra note 55, at 37 ("The general absence of temporary
balance of payments derogation provisions [in investment treaties] may be attributable to the
general perception that these agreements are generally designed to protect [foreign direct
investment]. Since this type of investment is generally not volatile, signatories may therefore not
view temporary balance of payments derogation as being a necessary safeguard.").
211 See, for exaple, Pardee Center Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 3 (noting that BITs generally
include exceptions for balance of payments problems or financial crises, but not for both);
VITERBO, supra note 4, at 131-42 (noting prudential carve-outs for financial regulation in most
trade and investment treaties), 249-73 (discussing and surveying safeguards clauses).
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express exceptions of any kind.212 Significantly, the U.S. generally refuses to
include such derogation provisions in its bilateral investment treaties. 213
Finally, multilateral trade agreements include some provisions related to
cross-border capital movements. 214 The General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), for example, enables signatories to make commitments to liberalize
regulation of their financial services sectorS215 and "covers capital transfers
related to trade in financial services."216 The treaty provides that "members must
refrain from imposing restrictions on international payments and transfers
associated with the current and capital transactions that are covered by the
specific commitments" under the agreement. 217 The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) 218 also covers trade in financial services (and, thus, some
cross-border investments), and it limits the restrictions that signatories can place
on related transfers. 219 NAFTA and GATS both expressly allow for derogation
from these obligations to address balance-of-payments problems. 2 0 Like the
212

213

See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 88; Pardee Center Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 7 (noting that
many bilateral investment treaties "do not have a balance of payments safeguard and/or a
prudential carve out" and criticizing many of the provisions that exist).
See Broomfield, supra note 87, at 2 (noting that the United States "has been particularly reluctant

214

to incorporate any derogation for capital controls into its [international investment agreements]");
see also Adam S. Chilton, Reconsidering the Motivations of the United States? Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program, at 1 (Coase-Sandor Inst. For Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 700, July 2014), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2467963
(noting that the U.S. has
entered into approximately 50 bilateral investment treaties in recent decades).
See Pardee Center Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 2 ("jN]egotiations at the WTO, for

215

financial services, take a 'positive list' approach whereby nations get to choose which sectors to
liberalize and even put limitations or conditions on such liberalization. Indeed, Chile liberalized
trade in cross-border financial services but reserved the right to deploy [capital flow management
measures] when monetary authorities saw it as necessary.").
See generally General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. II, 2, Annex on Financial Services,

216

Second Annex on Financial Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 283 [hereinafter GATS]; Ostry
et al., Managing Capital Inflows, supra note 68, at 20 (noting that signatories of GATS "incur
obligations to remove restrictions on capital flows if they have made commitments in the financial
services sector").
Pardee Center Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 6. See GATS, supra note 215, art. XI.

217
218
219

220

GATS, supra note 215, art. XL See Hagan, supranote 55, at 25; VITIRBO, supra note 4, at 216.
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
See Hagan, supra note 55, at 37; see also Broomfield, supra note 87, at 2 n.2 (noting that NAFTA
includes a free transfer provision).
See GATS, supra note 215, art. XII; NAFTA, supra note 218, arts. 140(1), 2104; Broomfield, supra
note 87, at 2 n.2 (noting that NAFTA allows for derogation from its free transfer obligation to
address balance-of-payments difficulties); Hagan, supra note 55, at 26 (describing the derogation
allowed from restrictions on capital movement under GATS and noting that GATS defers to the
Fund's treatment of restrictions on current payments), 37 (describing the derogation from
liberalization allowed under NAFTA); Ostry et al., Managing Capital Inflows, supra note 68, at 20
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other provisions discussed above, the derogation provisions under both NAFTA
and GATS are complex and consequently leave much room for uncertainty
about when they might apply.22 ' It is not clear, for example, whether the
derogation allowed under GATS applies to inflows as well as outflows.222
In sum, there is a significant number of international agreements that
create a variety of obligations for states regarding their treatment of capital
flows. The scope and content of these obligations are complicated, and some are
potentially conflicting. Most of these obligations are designed to facilitate trade
and investment, not to manage capital flows, and many of them constrain
policymakers from taking actions that might aid them in managing capital flows.
Although the trend in recent years has been for greater safeguards in
international agreements providing for liberalization, there is still a wide range of
approaches in this regard, many of which may not adequately balance the goals
of liberalization and stability.223 States may reasonably hesitate to adopt beneficial
capital flow restrictions at pivotal moments due to concerns about ex post
disputes or litigation over those restrictions pursuant to a trade or investment
agreement.22 Investment222treaties may give rise to greater concern in this regard
because they allow private investors to bring challenges,225 unlike trade
agreements, which only allow other states to do so. 226

(noting that GATS includes "a general balance-of-payments clause that allows the use of capital
controls under specific circumstances"); Pardee Center Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 3
(noting that GATS allows for balance -of-payments safeguards), 6 (noting that a general
"prudential carve out" may also qualify commitments to liberalization under the regime);
VITERBO, supra note 4, at 132-42, 221-22.
221

222

223

224

225

226

See Pardee Center Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 5-6 (noting that the balance of payments
exception under GATS is qualified by a "necessity test" and may prove cumbersome); Hagan,
supra note 55, at 37 (noting that the derogation provision under NAFTA "is relatively elaborate").
See Pardee Center Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 4 ("It may be that the GATS balance of
payments safeguard does not adequately guarantee that nations can use measures to regulate both
the inflow and outflow of capital because there is no reference to derogations to maintain
'financial stability."'); Hagan, supra note 55, at 27 ('TPlt is unclear from the text of Article XII
whether a derogation is also intended to apply to restrictions on capital inflows.").
See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 197 ("[TIhe long-term objective of capital account liberalization
should be coupled with adequate IEL safeguards.").
See, for example, Broomfield, supra note 87, at 2 (noting that "the existence of a balance-ofpayments crisis can be subjective" and that "[a] country may be threatened with lawsuits even if it
believes capital controls are needed to respond to a clear balance-of-payments dilemma").
See VITEiRBO, supra note 4, at 87 ("Certainly, the most distinctive feature of [international
investment agreements] is that they provide for the settlement of disputes between investors and
the host country.").
See Pardee Center Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 8 ("Finally the Task Force expressed
serious concern about the use of 'investor-state dispute resolution' in cases pertaining to
[investment treaties]. WTO disputes are settled 'state-to-state' and therefore nation-states can
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Perhaps most troubling, these bilateral, regional, and multilateral
agreements do not provide tools for addressing the external effects of domestic
policies regarding cross-border capital flows, especially spillovers or contagion.
They do not amount to an institutional mechanism for active international
coordination or for a global, systematic, or multilateral approach to capital
flows.227 As noted above, this has led to various calls for a distinct legal regime to
provide guidelines and coordination of domestic policies regarding capital
movements. 228 Thus far, this has proved to be an insurmountable challenge. The
OECD members made a prominent yet unsuccessful attempt in the late 1990s
to adopt a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. 229 That agreement included
guidelines on liberalizing capital management policies as well as an express
safeguard provision for derogation to preserve financial and economic
stability. 230 Thus, if it had been adopted, that agreement would have at least
represented a systematic approach to promoting and regulating global capital
flows.
The lack of an independent framework for regulating capital flows
underscores the potential benefit of the Fund's role in providing regulatory
guidance in the course of its bilateral surveillance and international coordination
through its multilateral surveillance. It is well situated, and appears to have the
authority, to develop a consistent approach to balancing liberalization of capital
movements with safeguards to preserve stability and help its members limit
negative externalities of their domestic policies.
That said, there is significant potential conflict between the Fund's
institutional view of the need to manage capital movements and the obligations
under many existing trade and investment treaties pushing more aggressively
towards liberalization. 23 1 To the extent that potential conflicts in formal
negotiate on behalf of the well-being of entire nations and financial systems-looking for
situations where the benefits to the majority outweigh losses to a minority.").

228

See IMF, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-Border Capital Flows, supra note 4, at 21 ("m[The
patchwork . .. for the regulation of international capital movements is generally not optimal for
[international monetary system] stability or for a multilateral approach.").
See discussion supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.

229

See VITERBO, supranote 4, at 139.

230

See id
See id. at 197-98 (noting, for example, that Iceland may have breached its obligations under the
European Economic Area agreement by imposing controls in 2008 pursuant to its IMF lending
program); see also Broomfield, supra note 87, at 3 ("Currently, it is possible that a country in crisis
will have to face two potentially conflicting international obligations: an IMF recommendation to
employ capital controls, and [international investment agreements] that allow investors to sue if
controls are imposed."); sources cited supra note 164 and accompanying text; see Deborah E.
Siegel, Using Free Trade Agreements to Control CapitalAccount Restrictions: Summary of Remarks on the
Relationsho to the Aandate of the IMF, 10 INT'l. LAW STUDENT Assoc.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 297, 301

227

231
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obligations arise, it is not entirely clear that the Fund's authority to enforce
members' obligations under its Articles would govern. Unless and until that
proposition is established, a state may be put in a situation of uncertainty about
its potential liability for actions that the Fund determines are necessary to satisfy
the state's obligations under the Fund's Articles. In any event, this potential
conflict can be resolved in the absence of a comprehensive regime through
express provisions in the relevant agreements clarifying the order or relationship
of obligations.232 This is the approach taken in GATS/WTO2 33 and some
international investment treaties,234 which include provisions ensuring that
obligations and exceptions to obligations are consistent with those pursuant to
the Fund's Articles.
B. Other Challenges for the Fund
In light of the growing consensus on the need for managing global capital
flows, scholars and policymakers have generally welcomed the Fund's newly
articulated approach and guidelines regarding capital flows.235 However,
numerous commentators believe that the Fund's new approach falls short of
what is necessary to provide sufficiently clear and predictable guidance to its
members regarding capital flow management.2 36 Some writers have observed that
the Fund's position does not concretely clarify when a country has reached "the
undoubtedly difficult-to-define institutional threshold for gaining the benefits of
capital account liberalization."237 Similarly, others have suggested that if the Fund
cannot provide sufficiently clear guidance in particular circumstances, its new
embrace of capital flow management may be both under and overaggressive;

232

233
234

235
236

237

(2003) (discussing the conflict between bilateral free trade agreements and international monetary
law).
See Broomfield, supra note 87, at 3; VITERBo, supra note 4, at 197-98.
See VITERBO, supra note 4, at 205-08, 222-32 (discussing formal deference to the Fund's
determinations by WTO bodies).
See id. at 255-60 (discussing clauses with substantive links to IMF framework in NAFTA, the
agreement creating the ASEAN Free Trade Area, and the proposed OECD Multilateral
Agreement on Investment), 198 (noting, however, that most bilateral and regional investment
agreements do not link to the IMF in this way).
See Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 8 (discussing the reaction to the Fund's newly
articulated approach).
See,for example, id. at 2 ("The new framework is also complicated, intentionally vague, and difficult
to implement given the absence of explicit guidelines. For example, it is ambiguous as to what
constitutes an 'exhaustive' use of macroeconomic policy space.").
Prasad & Rajan, supra note 8, at 150. See Moschella, supra note 22, at 10 (calling the Fund's new
approach hesitant and incoherent).
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some members may feel too free to adopt controls2 38 while others may delay too
long in employing them.239 The Fund's new view does not, for example, aim to
provide specific guidance on design questions regarding what transfers to target
with which kinds of restrictions under what circumstances.240 Without drawing
brighter conceptual lines, the Fund can only increase clarity through consistent
application and advice in its surveillance, conditional lending, and technical
assistance.
Assuming that the Fund can succeed in articulating clear and consistent
substantive guidance and advice for its members regarding capital flows, it also
faces the challenge of increasing the impact of its views.241 This is part of a more
general challenge the Fund faces in gaining greater traction for its attempts to
influence its members' policies in the course of bilateral and multilateral
surveillance.242 In fact, these challenges may be related: if the substance of the
Fund's advice is concrete and credible, it may be more likely to gain traction. It
is also possible, however, that there are limits to the impact of the Fund's
surveillance that stem from its legal framework and the complicated basis of its
jurisdiction over capital flows.243
Reflecting both concerns, some writers have advocated that the Fund
create and/or enforce a more formal rule-based framework for managing capital
flows and policing manipulative behavior through capital account policies. 2"
Such an approach would likely provide a greater degree of international
management and coordination of capital flows than the status quo, even with
more aggressive Fund surveillance of capital account policies. It would represent

238

See Gochoco-Bautista & Rhee, supra note 22, at 2 ("Without establishing more explicit rules on
the implementation of capital controls, there exist potential risks arising from their unilateral and
unbridled use.").

239

See id at 14 ("The preconditions under the IMF framework ... preclude the use of capital

controls except as a measure of last resort, but by which time, perhaps the use of capital controls
may be moot.").
240 See Hagan, supra note 55, at 46-47 ("The question of whether restrictions should differentiate
between certain types of transfers raises a number of complex issues.").
241 Increasing the traction of its surveillance and advice is a general and, arguably, defining challenge
242
243
244

for the Fund. See generally Feibelman,supra note 90.
See IMF, 2011 Triennial Surveillance Revien-Overview Paper, at 19-26 (Aug. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/082911.pdf.
See supra Section III.A.2.
See, for example, VITERBO, supra note 4, at 196-98 (citing the PAI.Ais-ROYAILE INITIATIVE, supra
note 54, and quoting Edwin Truman, Dealing with Volatile CapitalFlows: The Casefor Collective Action,
presentation at Swiss Nat'l Bank-IMF Conference,
May 11,
2010, available at
http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=1593); see also JEANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 112-14
(proposing "ambitious international oversight of capital controls," which would create greater
symmetry with the rules governing international trade).
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a significant incursion into sovereign power, however, and would at least require
amending the Fund's Articles to unequivocally extend the Fund's jurisdiction to
capital movements.24 5 As the previous effort to amend the Fund's Articles to
extend Fund jurisdiction to capital movements and the fate of the OECD's
Multilateral Agreement on Investment reflect, ambitious international lawmaking
in this area will face an uphill battle.
The Fund's surveillance of its members' policies regarding capital flows
therefore represents the first and only systematic effort to manage global capital
flows. It represents the first time that any regulatory actor has attempted to both
understand and influence the full range of factors affecting global capital flows,
and so it faces regulatory challenges that have not previously been tackled. As an
initial matter, for example, the analytical task of understanding the dynamics of
global capital flows is daunting. It requires an appreciation of the determinants
flowing from individual states as well as those that arise from multilateral
factors, including the accumulation and interaction of those state-level
phenomena.
To that end, since the crisis, the Fund has supplemented the core
components of its pre-existing multilateral surveillance, World Economic Outlook
and GlobalFinancialStabilityReport,246 with spillover reports24 and, more recently,
a Pilot External Sector Report.248 Both of these new initiatives focus heavily on the
role and impact of global capital flows on the domestic stability of the Fund's
members and the stability of the international monetary system.249
Assuming the Fund can develop credible analytical expertise with regard to
managing global capital flows, it will still face the challenge of influencing
members to take into account the external and multilateral effects of their capital
account policies. In some circumstances, it may be possible to convince
245

246

247

248

249

SeeJFANNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 112-14; see also PALAIS-ROYALE INITIATIVE, supra note 54, at 11

("Use of capital controls, subject to IMF surveillance under an amended Article VI, may be
warranted as an option to prevent disorderly exchange rate movements or financial instability.").
See IMF, Factsheet IMF Surveillance, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2014).
See, for example, IMF, 2013 Sbillover Report-Analytical Underpinnings and Other Background (2013),
availableat http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4787 (last accessed Nov. 13, 2014).
See IMF, 2013 Pilot External Sector Report (2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/
eng/2013/062013.pdf (last accessed Nov. 13, 2014).
See id. at 6 ("This report is structured to provide first an overview of developments in key external
sector dimensions-current accounts, capital flows, intervention policies, and trade policies-and
then provide an assessment of the external sector positions of the larger economies including
what needs to be done to close remaining imbalances."); IMF, 2013 Spillover Report-Analytical
Underpinnings and Other Background supra note 247, at 6 (emphasizing "policy uncertainty" in the
United States and in Europe, which might "raise global risk aversion, resulting in sharp
corrections in financial markets and capital outflows from emerging markets").
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members that these external effects feed back to them through the global
economy or systemic instability. But in many cases, members will likely resist
fully weighing the global effects of their policies; in such cases, it may prove
difficult to influence members to adjust their policies for the sake of systemic
stability. The Fund's leverage in such circumstances is arguably limited by the
fact that its formal authority over multilateral aspects of global capital flows is
significantly narrower than its jurisdiction over its members' policies that
threaten their domestic stability. As noted above, the Fund has determined that
its members do not have an independent obligation under the Fund's Articles to
endeavor to promote global stability.250 If members fail to respond to the Fund's
multilateral surveillance of their policies regarding capital flows, however, this
may provide good reason to consider the possibility of ensuring that the Fund's
members do have a more general obligation to promote global stability under
the Fund's Articles.
Grappling with such analytical and enforcement concerns will inevitably be
a central component of the broader challenge that the Fund faces in fulfilling its
new mandate to promote global stability through multilateral surveillance.
Helping its members manage capital flows will thus provide an early and crucial
opportunity to develop the scope and the modes of this function. Given the
importance of this new mandate and the centrality of capital flows in the
international monetary system, the Fund's efforts to help its members liberalize
and manage capital flows represents an important test of its ability to have a
meaningful impact on policies that it deems central to its regulatory functions.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a growing consensus among scholars and policymakers that states
must carefully manage capital flows and coordinate their policies for doing so
and that direct capital controls are a useful part of their policy toolkit in extreme
circumstances. After many years of evolution in this direction, the Fund has
become a leading proponent of this consensus and has adopted managing global
capital movements as a prominent part of its post-crisis mandate. It has done so
against a backdrop of a web of uncoordinated international trade and investment
agreements that commit states to liberalize their capital account policies.
Currently, the Fund is the only entity charged with the regulatory
responsibility for managing global capital flows, the connective tissue of the
international financial system. Its efforts in this regard represent the only
comprehensive multilateral framework designed to help states manage those
flows. For the foreseeable future, then, the Fund is in a unique position to play a
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productive role in helping states craft consistent approaches to managing capital
flows and in promoting international coordination of these policies. In any
event, this effort has become a centerpiece of the Fund's new integrated
approach to bilateral and multilateral surveillance. It is also one of the most
important-very possibly the most important-component of its participation in
international financial regulation. Helping manage global capital flows will thus
be a defining aspect of the Fund's regulatory role in coming years and test of
post-crisis mandate to promote global stability.
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